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Who Should Decide?
Judges and Juries in Trademark
Dilution Actions
by David S. Welkowitz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It has been sixteen years since a powerful form of federal trademark
protection became available to a select group of trademark owners-those
with "famous" trademarks. This relatively new protection, a form of
infringement called trademark dilution, is the result of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA).' This Act, which added a new
section to the federal trademark statutes, 2 was later amended by the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA). These statutes have
resulted in a plethora of court opinions, as litigants have eagerly sought
to exploit the power of this statute.! The major attraction of trademark

* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. Princeton University (A.B., 1975); New York
University Law School (J.D., 1979). Copyright 2011 by David S. Welkowitz.
I would like to thank my colleague, William W. Patton, who served as sounding board
and helpful critic as I thought through many of these issues.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c),
1127 (2006)).
2. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006). Throughout this Article, references
will be made to both the Lanham Act and its corresponding sections in the United States
Code.
3. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(2006)). The amendments made a number of significant changes in the operation of the
statute, some of which affect the discussion in this Article. Although the amendments are
often referred to by the acronym TDRA, the reader should assume that references in this
Article to the FTDA include the TDRA unless the context indicates otherwise.
4. See generally DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002 & Supp. 2011) [hereinafter WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION

and WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp. respectively). Whether the potential power of dilution
claims has actually led to successes in court is far more questionable. See generallyClarisa
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dilution is that, unlike the usual trademark infringement claim, dilution
does not require any showing of confusion.'
But this Article is not about the main elements of a federal dilution
claim; there is a plethora of scholarship discussing the merits and
demerits of this cause of action.' The focus of this Article is about
process-the process by which the decision-making that underlies the
claim is made. In particular, it is about the roles of the judge and jury
in this process and about various flaws, some inherent and some
artificially created, in the decision-making process. Few dilution claims
reach a trial and even fewer reach a jury;' thus, there are relatively few
cases that discuss the problem. For the most part, there is little
question that dilution cases will be decided by a judge, whether by
motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, or motion for a
preliminary injunction. Even if the case goes to trial, there normally
will not be a dispute over the proper decision maker. The statute makes
clear that the presumptive remedy for dilution is an injunction.' Thus,
the trial judge would be the decision maker, both as to fact and law,
subject to appropriate appellate review. However, in limited circumstances, the federal dilution statute permits the owner of a famous
trademark to obtain other remedies, such as monetary damages, where
someone other than a judge might be involved in the process. If the
offending user "willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the
famous mark," or "willfully intended to harm the reputation of the
famous mark," then the remedies of sections 35(a) and 36 of the
Lanham Act,'o which include various forms of monetary and other

Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2006).
5. Lanham Act § 43(cX1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX1) (creating a cause of action against one
whose "use of a mark or trade name in commerce ... is likely to cause dilution by blurring
or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of
actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury").
6. I plead guilty to being responsible for a certain amount of that scholarship. See
WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION and WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp., supra note 4.

7. Many are disposed of on motions to dismiss. Others are decided on summary
judgment motions. Still others result in a preliminary injunction ruling, which often
results in an appeal, followed by a negotiated settlement if the court of appeals upholds a
preliminary injunction. However, there have been several reported jury trials in dilution
cases. By and large, they are part of a larger action that includes conventional trademark
infringement claims. See discussion infra Part V.
8. Section 43(c)(1) begins as follows: "Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of
a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be
entitled to an injunction against" one whose actions are likely to cause dilution of the
famous mark. Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
9. Id. § 43(c)(5XB)(i), (ii), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX5XB)(i), (ii) (2006).
10. Id. §§ 35(a), 36, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a), 1118 (2006).
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relief, are available." However, the TDRA states that these other
remedies are "subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of
equity." 2 Furthermore, section 35(a) not only reiterates that its
provisions are subject to the principles of equity, it indicates that to
some degree awards of damages are subject to the discretion of the court,
solidifying the court's control over damage awards. 3
Thus, it seems that Congress intended that trial judges would be in
charge of conducting the trial in dilution cases, whether the plaintiff
requests an injunction or damages. But, as any first-year law student
can tell you, when the remedy sought is damages, the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution' 4 enters the picture and may
require a jury trial, at least for some of the issues.'
But the Seventh Amendment is only a starting point when discussing
the allocation of decision-making responsibility." For a number of
reasons, regardless of how one resolves the Seventh Amendment issue,
there will be jury trials in dilution cases." We can move beyond the
binary jury trial choice (trial by jury or judge for all issues) and ask
whether we can divide the roles ofjudge and jury depending on the issue
to be decided. This question involves a combination of constitutionality
and institutional competence. Yet this, too, is simply a prelude to a

11. Id. § 43(cX5), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5) (2006).
12. Id.
13. See id. § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). A portion of § 35(a) states the following:
In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not
exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the
recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its
discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according
to the circumstances of the case.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
15. Thirty-eight states have dilution laws, a majority of which mirror the original
federal law (four states have statutes that are similar to the current federal law). See
WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp., supra note 4, at 21-24. If dilution claims are brought under
state law as supplemental claims to a federal dilution claim, then the Seventh Amendment
would apply to those claims as well. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963);
Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 64 F.3d 742, 749 (1st Cir. 1995) (mandating jury trial
even where commonwealth court does not provide for it). This Article does not attempt to
determine whether state courts would hold jury trials; in any case, state dilution claims
are most often brought as part of a federal trademark suit.
16. Even when a jury trial is not required on the dilution claim, trial judges may
submit the entire case-assuming it includes other, jury-triable claims-to a jury and use the
jury's findings on dilution in an advisory capacity. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
17. One clear example is when a dilution claim is joined with another claim that clearly
requires a jury trial.
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larger issue. In theory, juries are supposed to decide historical facts,
while the judge decides issues of law. However, the line between "fact"
and "law" in many trademark claims, including dilution claims, is
sometimes a fuzzy one, and the demarcation between them is made even
more difficult by ill-defined statutory terms. This leads to several
questions. Can juries be instructed in a way that allows them to make
decisions that are consistent with the policies and limitations that are
central to dilution claims? To what degree can judges assert control over
the decision-making process, perhaps as to certain elements or perhaps
as to the entire decision? Where is the proper place to draw the line
between the province of the judge and that of the jury in these cases? An
examination of actual jury instructions further demonstrates flaws when
giving primary decision-making authority to juries. Can these flaws be
fixed? As will be seen, there is no simple answer to these questions.
Thus, this Article is a general examination of the appropriateness of
using juries as fact finders and, potentially, decision makers in
trademark dilution cases. In Parts II-IV, I discuss the Seventh Amendment issue in different forms. Parts II and III focus on whether the kind
of monetary remedy likely to be awarded in dilution claims is properly
denominated legal (in which case a jury is required) or equitable (in
which case it is not). Part III ultimately concludes that many dilution
cases need not be tried before a jury. Part IV discusses whether we can
separate one element of a dilution claim-what might be called a
"gatekeeper" element-and have it tried by a judge, while the remainder
of the case is tried to a jury.
Part V then takes on the larger issue of the proper allocation of
authority between the judge and jury. Its thesis is that juries are being
asked to make normative decisions but that those decisions are often
reviewed as if they are purely factual decisions. Exploring this thesis
involves several interrelated problems. One is the inequality of
information available to a judge and jury. Another is the degree to
which we assign, whether knowingly or by default, the creation of legal
parameters to juries and the propriety of such assignments. The second
issue leads to an examination of actual jury instructions to illuminate
the problem. This is followed by a discussion of why the assignment of
that role to juries is not institutionally appropriate. The section
concludes with a proposed jury instruction that attempts to mitigate this
problem.
I do not propose to solve the larger problem in this Article. The goal
is simply to lay out the problem using actual cases in which juries were
empanelled and to make some tentative suggestions about solutions.
Hopefully, this will lead to some useful insights and productive future
discussions about the appropriate means of deciding not only dilution
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cases, but many other types of cases as well. While that may seem a
rather modest aspiration, I submit that the basic problem is sufficiently
important and unrecognized, thus requiring further discussion before
robust solutions can be implemented.
II.

DILUTION AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT-FIRST, THE TEST

Jury trials in trademark infringement claims are not uncommon
events. However, our discussion is not about ordinary trademark
infringement claims; it is about trademark dilution claims. Traditional
claims of trademark infringement are based on a likelihood of consumer
confusion about the source or sponsorship of goods and services.
Trademark dilution is a somewhat unusual breed of trademark violation.
It is not based on consumer confusion; instead, it is intended to protect
the uniqueness of a strong trademark by precluding other uses of that
mark even when they do not cause confusion."
Until 1996, dilution
protection was exclusively a creature of state law, and a fairly recent one
at that.'9 In 1996, federal dilution protection commenced but was
limited to "famous" marks.2 0 At that time, most state dilution laws
only provided for injunctive relief; no monetary awards were possible
under those statutes.2 1 However, the federal statute does permit
damage awards, albeit under limited circumstances.22 If, and only if,
willful intent to trade on the recognition of or to harm the reputation of
the famous mark is shown, then monetary relief may be awarded.2 3
But the limited circumstances in which damages are available under the
federal statute do not change the basic problem. After all, damages are

18.
See WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp., supra note 4, at 4-7 (discussing trademark
dilution).
19. The first state statute protecting trademarks against dilution was enacted in
Massachusetts in 1947. Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7A, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (current
version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 110H, § 13 (Supp. 2010)). Prior to that, there were
scattered cases apparently giving relief in such situations. WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp.,
supra note 4, at 10-12. Even after 1947, only a handful of states enacted dilution laws
until the 1960s. Id. at 13, 19-21.
20. FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (2006)).
21. See WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp., supra note 4, at 15-25, 196. The federal statute
became effective on January 16, 1996. 109 Stat. at 987. Of the 32 states that had dilution

statutes at that time, only 5 allowed monetary damages. See WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp.,
supra note 4, at 16-25. They generally were the ones patterned after (or similar to), the
1992 Model State Trademark Bill. See id. No state dilution law allowed monetary
damages until Washington state in 1989. See id.
22. See Lanham Act §§ 35(a), 36, 43(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a), 1118, 1125(c)(5) (2006
& Supp. IV 2010).
23. Id. § 43(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(5).
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damages, and damages are normally the quintessential remedy for which
a jury trial is required. Why is there any doubt that a jury trial is
merited whenever monetary awards are possible?24 Why indeed. In
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,25 the United States Supreme Court appeared to decide that trademark infringement suits for damages carry
with them, under the Seventh Amendment to the United States
But the few trademark cases
Constitution,2 6 the right to a jury trial.
that have discussed the issue since then are divided-some hold that a
jury trial is mandated while others hold that it is not. 8 What accounts
for the split? The answer is found both in the statute and in the
mysterious pronouncements of the Supreme Court, often in the very
cases upholding a right to a jury trial.
The Seventh Amendment provides as follows:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.29
On its face, the amendment is simple: suits at common law for more
than $20 carry a right to a jury trial." But because of the ancient
separation of "common law" courts from the courts of equity, it is
necessary to decide whether an action is "legal"-that is, one "at common
law"-or equitable in order to determine whether a right to a jury trial

24. One situation in which a jury is not empanelled is a default judgment. A
significant number of dilution cases that result in damages are default judgments. For a
sampling of recent cases, see Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts, No. 09-4215 (JBS), 2010 WL
2521444 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Agnello, No. 08 Civ. 5452 (WHP),
2009 WL 2878098 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2009); Artemis Mktg. Corp. v. Rooms 2 Go Furniture,
Inc., No. 09-CV-2413 (FB)(SMG), 2009 WL 3247008, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2009) (referring
case to magistrate to calculate damages after default); Century 21 Real Estate, LLC v.
Bercosa Corp., 666 F. Supp. 2d 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).

25. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
27.
28.

Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 472, 476.
See infra text accompanying notes 145-71.

29. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
30. The second portion of the amendment-the so-called reexamination clause-prevents
a court from altering a jury verdict except as allowed at common law. See, e.g., Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482-83 (1935) (holding remittitur consistent with reexamination
clause, but not additur); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 43233 (1996) (discussing interplay of reexamination clause and state law). That provision is
not central to this analysis.
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exists." This task is complicated by the merger of law and equity into
a "civil action" by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.32
It would be an understatement to say that the contours of the jury
trial right often seem shrouded in mystery.3 Despite several Supreme
Court opinions on the subject, 34 there are many areas of uncertainty.
Some general principles can be stated. Although the Seventh Amendment speaks of suits "at common law,"" the jury trial right is not
limited to causes of action that existed in 1791, when the Seventh
Amendment was ratified. Causes of action embodied in federal statutes
passed recently, which create rights unknown in 1791, may also carry
a constitutional right to a jury trial." Thus, to use federal dilution
claims as the example, the fact that such claims may have been
unknown at common law will not preclude a right to trial by jury.
Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court reminded us of the importance of the jury trial. As the Court wrote: "Maintenance of the jury as
a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in
our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right
to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care." 7 Thus, in
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover," the Court held that where a
complaint-or, in Beacon Theatres, a counterclaim-includes both legal
and equitable claims, the legal claims must be tried to a jury before the
court determines the equitable claims." But Beacon Theatres does not
tell us how to distinguish what is legal from what is equitable; it simply
tells us that after the merger of law and equity in the federal courts,
preserving the right to a jury trial requires the court to proceed with the

31. It is worth noting that the Seventh Amendment only applies to suits brought in
federal court; the right to trial by jury in state court is governed by state law. E.g.,
Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95,99 n.1 (4th Cir. 1991). But cf Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (stating that federal law requires
that state courts give jury trial in Federal Employers Liability Act suits).
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38. Rule 38 "preserves" the right to trial by jury but does
nothing to guide the decision about when one is to be granted. See id.
33. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1007 (1992) (referring to "a cumbersome
system replete with anomalous and inconsistent rules governing jury practice").
34. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998);
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Dairy
Queen, 369 U.S. 469; Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
36. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974).
37. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 501 (quoting Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486).
38. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
39. Id. at 508-09.
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decision-making process in a manner that gives primacy to the jury as
fact finder. A subsequent case, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, addressed the
distinction between law and equity, albeit only to a degree. The case
involved a breach of contract claim under which the trademark DAIRY
QUEEN was licensed to the defendant. The complaint alleged both a
breach of contract and subsequent unauthorized use of the mark, which
would constitute trademark infringement.4 0 The crux of the jury trial
problem was that the complaint requested an "accounting" of the
damages owed to the plaintiff.' Because an accounting is often viewed
as an equitable proceeding, the plaintiff (the counterclaim defendant)
asserted that no trial by jury was required." However, the Court
rejected this assertion, noting that an equitable accounting assumed that
the parties' accounts were too complicated to be determined by a jury,
which was not the case here."3 That the remedy sought was labeled an
"accounting" did not sway the Court since the actual remedy was viewed
as no more than an ordinary claim for damages."
The Dairy Queen case tells us that labels alone do not distinguish
legal from equitable claims. But it is far from a comprehensive analysis
of the problem. Its most significant contribution to this discussion, apart
from its refusal to accept labels as controlling, is the context: it was in
part a trademark infringement action. This alone has made it an
influential decision in subsequent trademark cases that raise jury trial
questions. In addition, it clearly reinforces the Court's admonishment
in Beacon Theatres that jury trials are not to be dispensed with lightly.
However, it remained for a series of cases after Dairy Queen and Beacon
Theatres to refine the parameters of the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial.
Over time, the Court has created a historical test for determining
whether a jury trial is mandated: "First, we compare the statutory action
to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the
merger of the courts of law and equity .

. .

. Second, we examine the

40. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 474-75. There appears to have been some ambiguity
about whether the complaint simply alleged breach of contract, trademark infringement,
or both. See id. at 476-77.
41. Id. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff also requested an
injunction against further use of the trademark and against the defendant's collection of
money from its franchises. Id. at 475.
42. Id. at 477-78.
43. Id. at 478-79; see id. at 480-81 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing equitable
accounting requires that the accounts be of a complex nature). Justice Harlan viewed the
complaint as one of trademark infringement, rather than breach of contract. Id. at 480.
44. Id. at 477-78 (majority opinion).
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remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in
nature." Moreover, the Court has characterized the remedy portion
as the "more important" part of the test.46 The Court also made clear
that Congress cannot, by statute, shift the historical responsibilities of
a jury to the trial judge.47 Of course, stating the test and implementing
it are two different things. In particular, finding the best historical
analogy often proves elusive, making the remedy the key to the
analysis. 48
The two-part test will form the foundation of the analysis in Part III.
As will be seen, the test has been embellished in various ways that make
its application less than straightforward.
III.

APPLYING THE COURT'S TEST: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT,
DILUTION, AND DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS

The HistoricalAnalogue
The first part of the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment4 9 analysis
asks whether there is a historical analogue to the cause of action at
issue and whether that analogue would have been tried in the courts of
law or the courts of equity in 1791.o Although one can trace logical

A.

45.

Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18 (citations omitted).

46. Granftnanciera,492 U.S. at 42; Tull, 481 U.S. at 421 (quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at
196).
47. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 353. In Feltner,the Court held that a jury must determine the
damages under the statutory damages section of the Copyright Act, despite the fact that
Congress clearly intended that this determination be made by the trial judge. Id.
48. In Terry, the Court split over which of the two most promising analogies (one
equitable, one legal) was the most appropriate, with no majority for either. 494 U.S. at 570
(plurality opinion); id. at 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 574-75 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (resting his decision solely on the remedy). In Tull, the Court also found the
search for a historical analogue to be inconclusive. 481 U.S. at 421. The Court here also
stated that its search for an analogous claim included both the nature of the claim and the
relief sought. Id. at 421, n.6. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
377 (1996) (noting that historical precedent did not indicate clearly whether claim
construction was the province of a judge or a jury). In Markman, the Court did not adhere
precisely to the two-part test. It did not look at the remedy involved, presumably because
the issue was not whether the entire case should be tried to a jury, but whether one issueclaim construction-was the province of a judge or jury. See id. at 376 (restating the
historical test in different terms). The Court acknowledged that the ultimate issue of
infringement would be tried to a jury. Id. at 377. See also Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 4849 (acknowledging that, although setting aside fraudulent conveyances was primarily legal,
equity may have had concurrent jurisdiction).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
50. The Court has not made clear whether the existence of a clear historical analogue
makes the second facet of the analysis superfluous. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers,
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analogues to trademark dilution, denominating them as legal or
equitable is not a simple task.
Trademark dilution claims were unknown in the late eighteenth
century. What, then, is the proper historical analogue? The logical
answer would appear to be trademark infringement claims, or perhaps
unfair competition claims. However, even trademark infringement was
somewhat uncommon in 1791-the first reported United States trademark case was in the nineteenth century"-and although one can trace
an English trademark-like case back to the sixteenth century, such cases
apparently were not common even in the late eighteenth century.52
Unfair competition claims, from which trademark infringement can be
derived, apparently trace to the same source." But dilution claims are
peculiar; unlike traditional infringement claims, they do not rely on any
notion of deception or confusion. And, unlike unfair competition, which
itself often relies on deception or confusion, the archetypical dilution
claim would not be between competitors. Thus, the analogy is somewhat
imperfect, though it is probably the best available.
Even categorizing dilution claims as part of the law of trademarks and
unfair competition does not resolve the question. True enough, Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood" included a trademark claim, and that was found
to be legal.55 But historically trademark claims were not the exclusive
province of courts of law. They appear to have been equally, perhaps
even predominantly, actions in equity." Dilution, moreover, did not
really evolve naturally from those claims. Although a smattering of
dilution-like claims can be found in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, dilution claims are largely creatures of state statutes, passed

Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 584 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that
once historical analogue is found, inquiry should end); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348 (1998) ("To determine whether a statutory action is more
analogous to cases tried in courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty,
we examine both the nature of the statutory action and the remedy sought.").
51. Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 214 (1837).
52. See Mark A. Thurmond, Ending the Seventh Amendment Confusion: A Critical
Analysis of the Right to a Jury Trial in Trademark Cases, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 5865 (2002) (discussing early English cases); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2 (4th ed. 2008).
53. See Thurmond, supra note 52; MCCARTHY, supra note 52.
54. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
55. Id. at 479.
56. Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362, 364 (6th Cir. 1985); MCCARTHY,
supra note 52 (citing Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of
Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 561 (2006)).
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in the wake of a proposal by Frank Schechter to give such protection."
Under these state laws, the exclusive remedy for dilution was an
injunction." Monetary remedies for dilution did not exist until the state
of Washington enacted a statute permitting damages in 1989.59 Thus,
one could reasonably assert that dilution cannot easily be analogized to
a historical cause of action that is clearly legal. That, once again, leads
us to examine the remedy.

B. The Remedy Problem: Unjust Enrichment, Disgorgement, and
Restitution
1. Not all Monetary Remedies are Legal. The second part of the
Supreme Court's test for a jury trial right, and seemingly the most
crucial, is whether the remedy is equitable or legal. Because we are
focusing on cases involving requests for monetary relief, one would
expect that the answer would be a simple one. However, that the claim
is one for monetary relief does not answer the question. Various
Supreme Court opinions have indicated that certain monetary claims are
equitable in nature.
In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,so discussing plaintiff's arguments against a jury trial right for statutory copyright
damages, the Court stated the following: "Columbia [the defendant]
makes no attempt to draw an analogy between an action for statutory
damages under § 504(c) and any historical cause of action-including
those actions for monetary relief that we have characterized as
equitable, such as actions for disgorgement of improper profits." The
Court, in Feltner,cited two previous Supreme Court cases at this point,

Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry" and T4ll v.
United States.6 3 In Terry, the Court stated that "we have characterized
damages as equitable where they are restitutionary, such as in'action[s]

57.

See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.

REV. 813 (1927); Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7A, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (current version
at MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 110H, § 13 (Supp. 2010)).
58. See, e.g., Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7A, 1947 Mass. Acts 300.

59. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.160 (2003), availableat http://aps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/.
The Washington statute was modeled after a proposed federal law that failed in Congress
in 1988. See David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining TrademarkDilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531,

582-83 (1991) (discussing the failure of the 1988 dilution proposal).
60. 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
61.
62.

Id. at 352.
494 U.S. 558 (1990).

63.

481 U.S. 412 (1987).
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for disgorgement of improper profits."'" This adds a small amount of
explanation-that actions for disgorgement of profits characterized as
"restitution" may be deemed equitable, even if they result in monetary
damages. Tll adds a bit more explanation. In 71ll, the Government
argued that suits for Clean Water Act" penalties should be analogized
to actions for disgorgement of profits." The Court disagreed, noting
that actions for disgorgement are brought as "a remedy only for
restitution-a more limited form of penalty than a civil fine. Restitution
is limited to 'restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that
Thus, it seems
which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant."
that "restitutionary" remedies designed to restore the status quo can be
deemed equitable, even if they involve the payment of money.68
The Court's willingness to view some monetary remedies as equitable
goes back beyond its recent cases to the early part of the twentieth

century.

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.69 was a

trademark case involving the alleged infringement of the mark
"American Girl," which was used on shoes. An injunction was issued,
and the only evidence adduced to support monetary relief was directed
to the defendant's profits." In the course of disposing of the defendant's argument that the defendant's profits were not a proper remedy,
the Court noted that "it is insisted by petitioner that the normal
recovery does not include the gains and profits of defendant, according

to the rule admittedly applicable in equity to trademarkcases."" Later,
when setting forth its rationale for upholding the defendant's profits as
a proper remedy, the Court stated the following:
The right to use a trademark is recognized as a kind of property, of
which the owner is entitled to the exclusive enjoyment to the extent
that it has been actually used . . .. The infringer is required in equity

to account for and yield up his gains to the true owner, upon a
principle analogous to that which charges a trustee with the profits

64. 494 U.S. at 570 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 424).
65. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
66. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
67. Id. (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946)).
68. The Court's reference to a "purchaser or tenant" looks like a reference to a
constructive trust, where the profits of one are deemed to be held in trust for the rightful
owner. Id.; see Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916).
69. 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
70. Id. at 253-56. The defendant claimed that the trademark was descriptive and
thereby invalid and that the only basis for recovery was unfair competition. Id. at 256.
On that theory, the defendant asserted that its profits were not a proper measure of relief.
Id. However, the Court ruled that "American Girl" was a valid trademark. Id. at 256-57.
71. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
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acquired by wrongful use of the property of the cestui que trust. Not
that equity assumes jurisdiction upon the ground that a trust exists
[T]he jurisdiction must be rested upon some other equitable
ground,-in ordinary cases, as in the present, the right to an injunction-but the court of equity, having acquired jurisdiction upon such a
ground, retains it for the purpose of administering complete relief,
rather than send the injured party to a court of law for his damages.
And profits are then allowed as an equitable measure of compensation,
on the theory of a trust ex maleficio."
Hamilton-Brown Shoe was decided in 1916, well before the merger of
law and equity in the federal system." Thus, the Court's conclusion in
Hamilton-Brown Shoe that a court of equity would hear a claim for
4
disgorgement of profits in a trademark dispute is significant." On the
other hand, it is not the strongest authority for refusing a jury trial
where the remedy is disgorgement of profits. The case assumed that
equitable jurisdiction could be based on some other equitable remedial
ground, such as an injunction." The Court relied on the equitable
clean-up doctrine, which allows equity to award monetary relief as an
adjunct to the main equitable remedy, to permit a court of equity to
award a disgorgement remedy.76 In almost all cases, a dilution plaintiff
would ask for an injunction-a traditional equitable remedy, as well as
a monetary remedy. Thus, the basic jurisdictional issue identified in
Hamilton-Brown Shoe would not be a problem. It has been argued that
the equitable clean-up doctrine did not survive Dairy Queen, but it
seems clear that courts may order certain types of monetary payment as
a means of affording complete equitable relief." Nevertheless, Hamilton-Brown Shoe is not a strong basis to assert that disgorgement is an
equitable remedy standing by itself. In any event, the later Supreme
Court cases asserting that disgorgement is equitable were not limited to
the clean-up situation, although they do appear limited to cases in which
the remedy is somehow either deemed "restitutionary," or (somewhat
contrarily) noncompensatory. Moreover, the notion that disgorgement
of profits is equitable has a fairly significant following in the lower

72.
73.

Id. at 259.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 39 advisory committee's note (discussing the roles of courts and

juries in particular cases).

74.
75.
76.
1984).
77.

Hamilton-Brown Shoe, 240 U.S. at 259.
Id.
See id.; see, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 725 F.2d 440, 442-43 (7th Cir.
E.g., Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 661 (6th Cir. 1996).
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federal courts." At the very least one can say that if the only monetary remedy sought is disgorgement of defendant's profits, then there is
a serious question whether a jury trial is required.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court probably did not look carefully at
the nuances of restitution and unjust enrichment when it characterized
an equitable disgorgement of profits as restitutionary." The difficulties
presented by this distinction are evident in the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.so Section 1 links the concepts of
restitution and unjust enrichment: "A person who is unjustly enriched
at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution."" As the
accompanying comments make clear, the phrase "unjust enrichment" is
not well defined." Comment c deals with the issue of "Restitution and
restoration,"" the subject of the Supreme Court's remarks about
disgorgement in 71l1.8 As the comment states,

78. E.g., Grace v. Rosenstock, 228 F.3d 40, 50-51 (2d Cir. 2000); LeBlanc v. Cahill, 153
F.3d 134, 153 (4th Cir. 1998) (declaring disgorgement under ERISA equitable); Herman v.
S.C. Nat'l Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding the same as LeBlanc); SEC
v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1995); SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1993);
SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978); Am. Air Filter Co.
v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting, also, that profits are not the same
as damages); Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243
(D. Colo. 2001) (stating "restitution of profits" is equitable); Resnick v. Resnick, 763 F.
Supp. 760, 767-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Robert Bruce, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 343 F.
Supp. 1333, 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see also Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., 22 F. Supp.
91, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (finding that equity can decree an accounting for profits in copyright
cases even without granting an injunction), rev'd in part on other grounds, affd in part,
Sheldon v. Moredall Realty, 95 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1938) ("Nor can we be sure at this time
that equity does not have concurrent jurisdiction of the accounting on general principles.");
Fishel v. Lueckel, 53 F. 499, 501 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) (finding a right to accounting incident
to injunction in copyright case); Gilmore v. Anderson, 38 F. 846, 848 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889)
(noting that while forfeiture is not within equity jurisdiction, accounting of profits is); cf
NordicTrack, Inc. v. Consumer Direct, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 415, 423 n.15 (D. Minn. 1994)
(calling the issue "unclear" but declining to decide it).
79. For a discussion of the many and various uses of the term "restitution," see
generally Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577
(2002). Among other things, Professor Murphy asserts that classifying a remedy as
restitutionary does not resolve the issue of law versus equity. Id. at 1580, 1598-1607, 162328 (describing, in the latter pages, the notion that disgorgement is always equitable as
"misleading").
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).
81. Id.
82. See id. § 1 cmt. b. Comment b favors the phrase "unjustified enrichment" over
"unjust enrichment" as being more explanatory and recognizes the danger that "unjust
enrichment" is often "a name for a legal conclusion that remains to be explained." Id.
83. Id. § 1 cmt. c.
84. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
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the concepts of unjust enrichment and restitution (in the literal
meaning of "restoration") correlate only imperfectly . . .. [T] here are

significant instances of liability based on unjust enrichment that do not
involve the restoration of anything the claimant previously possessed.
The most notable examples are cases involving the disgorgement of
profits, or other benefits wrongfully obtained, in excess of the plaintiffs
loss.'
The same comment further states the following: "When used in this
Restatement to refer to a theory of liability or a body of legal doctrine,
the terms 'restitution' and 'unjust enrichment' will generally be treated
This would belie the distinction in Thl between
as synonymous."'
restorative and nonrestorative claims for disgorgement." To the extent
that restitution is viewed as primarily equitable, equating restitution
and unjust enrichment, and including nonrestorative remedies within
the realm of restitution, makes disgorgement look more like an equitable
remedy. However, equating all remedies labeled "restitution" as
equitable is probably a mistake."
Of course, none of these comments directly addresses the issue of a
jury trial. The issue of characterizing restitution as either legal or
equitable is discussed in Section 4 of the Restatement. Section 4(1)
states the following: "(1) Liabilities and remedies within the law of
restitution and unjust enrichment may have originated in law, in equity,
or in a combination of the two."" The very first comment to this
section illuminates the problem:
The status of restitution as belonging to law or to equity has been
ambiguous from the outset. The answer is that restitution may be
either or both . . . . The purpose of § 4(1) is to alert the reader to the
fact that modern restitution is difficult to characterize in law/equity
terms.90
The Restatement does not resolve the problem but recognizes the
difficulty it causes for the jury trial issue. Moreover, as another
comment to this section notes, the historical origins of unjust enrichment
and restitution, while containing equitable principles, can be traced to
a pronouncement of a judge of the law courts.91

85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
86. Id.
87. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
88. See Murphy, supra note 79.

& UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§

1 cmt. c.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4(1).
90. Id. § 4 cmt. a.
91. Id. § 4 cmt. b (citing Moses v. Macferlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 678, 681 (K.B.)).
89.
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The Restatement's ambiguity and reticence about the subject
notwithstanding, we are required by the Seventh Amendment to make
some judgments about the matter. And there is some additional
guidance that may be gleaned from other Supreme Court cases. The
Court's earlier, somewhat offhand, comments about restitution and
equity were given additional explanation in two Supreme Court cases
from outside the Seventh Amendment context that better reflect the
ambiguity indicated by the Restatement.
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson92 and
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.," medical insurance
companies sought to recover medical payments made on behalf of their
insureds out of proceeds recovered by the insured persons from third
parties (namely, a tortfeasor who caused injury to the insured)." In
both cases, the key question for the Supreme Court was whether the
action by the insurance companies against the insureds would be deemed
equitable or legal in nature." This issue arose because the applicable
federal law-a provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA)?6-only permits such suits if they are brought "to
obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief . . . ."'

In both cases, the

insured recovered funds from a tortfeasor in a lawsuit after the medical
insurer had paid for various medical bills, and the insurers sought to
recover their payments from the recoveries.9" In Knudson, the Court
ruled that the insurer's suit was essentially one for breach of contract to
impose personal liability on the defendants according to their contract
with the insurance plan and, as such, was legal, not equitable, in
nature.9 However, four years later, in Sereboff, the Court distinguished Knudson and held that the insurer's suit was equitable in
nature."'o In both cases, the Court compared the lawsuits to an action
Noting that restitution was not always an action in
for restitution.'
equity, the Court sought to determine the characteristics of an equitable
action for restitution.102 The Court found that actions in equity were

92. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
93. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
94.
95.

Knudson, 534 U.S. at 208; Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 360.
See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210; Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361.

96. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C. tits. 5, 18, 26, 29, and 42).

97. ERISA § 503(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006).
98. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 208; Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 360.
99. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210, 221.
100.
101.
102.

Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 363, 369.
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213-14; Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 363.
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213-14; Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 363.

2012]

WHO SHOULD DECIDE?

445

brought to impose an equitable lien on an identifiable fund or property,
whereas actions at law sought to obtain funds from the general assets
of the defendant.o In Sereboff, the Court distinguished Knudson on
the ground that, in Knudson the funds sought by the insurer's lawsuit
had been deposited directly in a trust fund set up under California law
whereby the settlement funds were segregated into a fund to provide for
the care of the injured party.'04 Thus, the Knudson suit could not
reach the funds received from the settlement and, therefore, sought to
recover funds directly from the Knudsons personally.0 s By contrast,
in Sereboff, the funds sought by the insurer had been paid directly to the
Although the funds may have been commingled by
injured party.'
the time of the lawsuit, they were still sufficiently identifiable to impose
an equitable restraint on them.' 7 However, the Court also noted that
the insurer's claim was the result of an agreement between the parties
and indicated that the agreement was important in determining that the
lien on the funds received by the insured was equitable, not legal."10
These two cases supply further bases to analyze the remedy of
The key under Sereboff and Knudson
disgorgement of profits.'
appears to be whether the suit seeks to recover an identifiable fund in
the possession of the defendant belonging (equitably) to the plaintiff, or
whether the suit seeks simply to impose personal liability on the
defendant from the defendant's general assets.
However, although Sereboff and Knudson provide some additional
guidance to the Court's understanding of the relationship between
restitution and equity, they are not without contradictions. While
consistent with the "restorative" idea of restitution, both cases could be
seen as simple breaches of contracts. A common remedy for breach of
contract is restoring the plaintiff to the position she would be in if the
contract had been fulfilled."o That makes both cases look like ordinary claims at law. Neither Sereboff nor Knudson deals squarely with
unjust enrichment in the larger sense represented by disgorgement of

103. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213-14; Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 363.
104. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362.
105. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213-14.
106. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 362-63.
107. See id. at 364.
108. Id. at 364-65.
109. In another ERISA case, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248,260 (1993), the
Supreme Court characterized "restitution of ill-gotten plan assets or profits" as equitable.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a)(1981); Lakota Girl Scout Council,
Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 639-40 (8th Cir. 1975).
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profits."' On the other hand, there are so many references in Supreme Court cases to disgorgement as an equitable remedy that it is
difficult to ignore them, even if they are not well explained.

2. A Closer Look at the Monetary Remedy for Dilution.

We

have focused much of our attention on a particular remedy-disgorgement
of defendant's profits. The reason for this focus is that disgorgement is
the most likely monetary remedy available to dilution plaintiffs. To see
why, let us examine the remedies structure for federal dilution claims.
The primary remedy for dilution is an injunction." 2 That much is
clear from Section 43(c)(1) of the Lanham Act,"' the operative section
of the dilution statute, which mentions only injunctive relief."'
However, under limited circumstances, another section of the law allows
noninjunctive relief as well. Section 43(cX5), which is the provision in
the federal dilution statute permitting an award of damages, reads as
follows:
In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous
mark shall be entitled to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116
of this title. The owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the
remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of this title, subject to
the discretion of the court and the principles of equity if(A) the mark or trade name that is likely to cause dilution by blurring
or dilution by tarnishment was first used in commerce by the person
against whom the injunction is sought after October 6, 2006; and
(B) in a claim arising under this subsection(i) by reason of dilution by blurring, the person against whom the
injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the
famous mark; or
(ii) by reason of dilution by tarnishment, the person against whom the
injunction is sought willfully intended to harm the reputation of the
famous mark.i'

111. See generally Knudson, 534 U.S. 204; Sereboff, 547 U.S. 356. The statement in
Mertens appears to contemplate a broader concept of unjust enrichment as equitable, but
it would be a mistake to make too much of a less than fully analyzed comment. See 508
U.S. at 260.
112. See Lanham Act § 43(cXl), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. Id. § 43(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX5) (2006). Section 1117(a), corresponding to
§ 35(a) of the Lanham Act, is the chief provision in the trademark statute providing for
monetary relief. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006). Section 1117(c) provides a separate damage
remedy for trademark counterfeiting. Lanham Act § 35(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2006).
Section 1117(d) provides a statutory damage remedy for cybersquatting. Lanham Act
§ 35(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) (2006). Section 1118, corresponding to § 36 of the Lanham Act,
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On its face, the statute points to the judge as the arbiter of damage
awards.' 1 6 It makes any award "subject to the discretion of the court
and the principles of equity," both of which point to a judicial decision.11 7 It is not illogical to assume that Congress wanted the courts
to keep a tight rein on damage awards for dilution claims. For most of
the fifty years preceding the federal statute, dilution protection meant
only an injunction."' Under the federal dilution law, damages are
recoverable only in limited circumstances; indeed, dilution itself is only
remediable under federal law if plaintiff's mark is "famous.""1
Congress may have wanted courts to make sure that dilution protection
does not overshadow ordinary trademark infringement by making the
award of any remedy subject to the court's discretion.
Section 43(cX5) does not specify what kind of other relief is available
upon proof of "willful intent" to trade on the famous mark's reputation
(for blurring claims) or to harm the famous mark's reputation (for
tarnishment claims). 20 Instead, it references Sections 35 and 36 of the
Lanham Act. 1' Section 35(a) is the most pertinent here, providing in
part:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or
(d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title,
shall have been established in any civil action arising under this
chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of
sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of

equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by
the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. 2 2

allows a court to order the destruction of infringing articles. 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006).
116. See Lanham Act § 43(cX5), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX5).
117. Id.
118. Massachusetts enacted the first dilution statute in 1947, which provided only for
injunctive relief. See Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7A, 1947 Mass. Acts 300. The first
dilution statute to permit damages was enacted in Washington, in 1989. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.77.160.
119. Lanham Act § 43(cX5), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5).
120. See id.
121. Sections 35 and 36 of the Lanham Act correspond to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) and
1118. Sections of the Lanham Act are commonly referred to by their original section
number, rather than the codified section number.
122. Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (emphasis added).
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Clearly, defendant's profits are a permissible remedy for dilution, as are
plaintiff's actual losses, though again "subject to the principles of

equity."1 23

Consider now the probable monetary remedies in a dilution case. The
archetypical dilution claim is by the owner of a famous mark against
someone offering non-competing goods or services under the same or a
similar mark.'24 If the defendant is not a competitor (and, in particular, if there is no consumer confusion about the source of each party's
goods or services) then the plaintiff will not lose any sales. Although the
plaintiff could claim that its mark's "uniqueness" is damaged by the
dilution, it will be difficult to quantify that loss. Actual economic harm
is not an element of a dilution claim.'25 Thus, the most logical remedy,
other than an injunction, is a disgorgement of the defendant's profits
from the use of the famous mark. If the defendant intentionally traded
on the plaintiff's reputation, then the defendant's profits are an equally
logical remedy since the defendant's gains may have been obtained by
using the plaintiff's brand name. If the defendant engaged in dilution
by tarnishment'26 and intentionally harmed the mark's reputation,
there could be some actual demonstrable monetary loss to the plaintiff
in the form of lost sales, which would undoubtedly be a legal remedy.
But if no such loss occurred-or if the court is concerned with unjust
enrichment-the court may view disgorgement of the defendant's profits

123. Id.
124. This refers to a form of dilution called "blurring," which is defined as an
"association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark." Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006). Ironically, particularly where the diluting use is not an Internet
domain name, it is very common for successful FTDA claims to be between competitors or
near competitors. E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.
2000); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999) (addressing competing
makers of fish-shaped crackers), abrogated on other grounds by Moseley v. Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003), as recognized in Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 435 n.96 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); N.Y.C. Triathlon,
LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Big Boy Rest. v.
Cadillac Coffee Co., 238 F. Supp. 2d 866 (E.D. Mich. 2002). But see Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n
v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that diluting use was a domain name,
evisa.com); Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int'l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1820 (E.D. Cal. 2007). But the
non-competing second user is the paradigmatic situation.
125. See Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
126. Dilution by tarnishment is a separate form of dilution, which is defined as
"association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that harms the reputation of the famous mark." Lanham Act § 43(cX2XC), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(2XC) (2006).
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as a logical remedy.'
Thus, whether the claim is for dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment, the defendant's profits are a likely
remedy. Although the plaintiff may seek to recover actual losses, as
measured, for example, by lost sales (most likely in a case between
competitors), disgorgement will likely be the more common monetary
remedy.'28 Thus, it seems wise to focus on whether this remedy would
be considered legal or equitable.
Both Section 43(cX5) and 35(a) point to the judge as the arbiter of
damages and make damage awards "subject to the principles of
equity. 1 2 9 As noted earlier, Section 43(c)(5) inserts the additional
qualifier "subject to the discretion of the court."ao Given that the
"subject to the principles of equity" language alone has not precluded
jury trialsa13 and given that trademark, or trademark-like, cases were
tried to both judges and juries before the merger of law and equity, it is
interesting to consider why Congress thought (or appeared to think) it
could direct courts of equity to make damage awards.
If we compare Section 35(a) to other intellectual property statutes, we
find that neither Section 504 of the Copyright Act,"3 2 nor Section 284
of the Patent Act, 33 the damages sections, contains any such "principles of equity" language. 3' 4 Indeed, the Patent Act expressly recognizes the possibility that a jury will assess damages.'3 ' That should raise
a question of what the drafters of the Lanham Act were thinking when
they inserted the language. 3 6

127. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 187-202. In George
Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., the court identified three rationales for awarding defendant's
profits as damages: as a measure of actual damages, as a remedy for unjust enrichment,
or "to deter a willful infringer from doing so again." 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992)
(quoting Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 1984)).
128. George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1539.
129. Lanham Act § 43(cX5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a); Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(cX5).
130. Lanham Act § 43(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5).
131. E.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 644, 646 (D. Me.
1986). In fact, because § 43(c)(5) refers to the remedies provided by § 35(a), the "principles
of equity" language in § 43(c)(5) appears a bit redundant. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a),
1125(c)(5).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 504; 35 U.S.C. § 284.
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
136. The language seems to have made its first appearance relatively late in the
drafting process, in 1945, in H.R. 1654, § 35, 79th Cong. (1945). See also Act of July 5,
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 35, 60 Stat. 427, 440.
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It appears that the drafters believed that at least one measure of
recovery would be deemed equitable. The most likely candidate is the
defendant's profits. "[Diamages sustained by the plaintiff"'37 seems
clearly legal, and the fact that courts of law did entertain trademark
infringement suits indicates that such a remedy should be regarded as
a legal, not equitable, remedy. By contrast, at a minimum, the history
of awards of the defendant's profits indicates that courts of equity
entertained suits requesting that remedy, including trademark suits.
One could pass the language in the statute off as a reference to general
equitable principles, but that seems much too facile. More than likely,
the drafters believed that some or all of the remedies available in
trademark infringement actions-or at least the ones listed in Section
35(a)-were actionable in a court of equity prior to the merger of law and
equity-which took place just eight years prior to the enactment of the
Lanham Act."' Because the Lanham Act percolated for so many years
in Congress, it was conceived before the merger occurred.13 ' This
assumption is supported by other parts of Section 35(a). Consider the
following language:
In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the
circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as
actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the court
shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either
inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment
for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the
circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. 4 o
Clearly, the provision assumes that the court-that is, a judge, not a
jury-will be making the ultimate damage award. Although that
language is not controlling-similar language in the Copyright Act was
found not to preclude a jury trial in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc. 1 -the last sentence quoted above provides an interesting clue to the drafters' thinking. As with the "principles of equity"

language, nothing like this appears in either the Copyright Act (whether
the current version or the 1909 Act) or the Patent Act.'42 This lan-

137. § 35, 60 Stat. at 440.
138. Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); see FED. R. Civ. P. 39 advisory
committee's note.
139.

140.
141.
142.
court to

See infra note 145.

Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (emphasis added).
523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998).
See 17 U.S.C. § 504; 35 U.S.C. § 284. Section 284 of the Patent Act also allows the
treble the damages, but without any limiting language. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
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guage, precluding a punitive award even when the court is authorized
to award an amount in excess of the proven damages or profits, has been
a source of difficulty for courts.143 It seems anomalous to permit a
court to add to the proven damages, while preventing the court from
doing so as a penalty for bad actions. However, if one views the
language through the lens of the law/equity distinction, it makes more
sense. As the Supreme Court has told us, penalties were traditionally
viewed as remedies at law.1 4 4 Therefore, if the remedy was seen as
punitive, it could only be granted by a court of law. However, if the
remedy is not a penalty, then, assuming it was otherwise within the
jurisdiction of equity, a court of equity could make the award intended
by the statute. Moreover, since the statute clearly contemplates that a
court should be guided by a sense of what is just, as well as the
"principles of equity," it makes sense that the drafters thought that the
remedies provided by the quoted language would be available in an
action in equity. Given the timing of the Lanham Act's legislative
drafting and passage, just before and after the merger of law and equity
in the federal courts, it is hard to see this as accidental.14 5 The
drafters presumably were aware of the distinctions between and
limitations of actions at law and equity. That they were careful to add
this limitation indicates that they assumed equity had jurisdiction of
such cases. This was not simply a policy judgment about which body,
judge or jury, was better able to make the assessment. It was about
which body was the proper agent to make that determination.
Again, the focus seems to be disgorgement as a possible equitable
remedy. At this point, we will examine the case law to see whether
Congress's understanding-which, after Feltner, is simply hortatory-has
been borne out.

143. See Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1347 (7th Cir. 1994).
144. Tull, 481 U.S. at 422.
145. The "compensation and not a penalty" language appeared in a very early version
of the bill in the House and an even earlier version in the Senate. H.R. 6284, 69th Cong.
§ 18(d) (1926), IPMALL.INFO, http://ipmall.info/hosted resources/lipa/trademarks/PreLan
hamAct_002_HR_6284.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2011); S. 2679, 68th Cong. § 18(d) (1925),
IPMALL.INFO, http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/trademarks/PreLanhamAct 001_S
2679.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). The House version, part of H.R. 6284, was issued in
1926, twelve years before the merger of law and equity. H.R. 6284 § 35. The Senate
version was issued in 1925. S. 2679 § 34. The early House and Senate versions, in Section
18(h), state that, in addition to an injunction, a "court may give the plaintiff the benefit of
all other remedies named in this section," which would include the defendant's profits.
H.R. 6284 § 18(h); S. 2679 § 18(h).
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3. Application: Dilution, Disgorgement, and Juries. Several
lower court cases have relied on the equitable nature of disgorgement of
profits to deny jury trials in trademark cases.14 6 One of the more
extensive discussions is in Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro
Corp.147 Discussing the plaintiffs claim for disgorgement of profits for
the defendant's wrongful use of the plaintiff's trademark, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York noted that
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that
disgorgement as a remedy for unjust enrichment was equitable, not
legal.148 The court further distinguished between claims for profits as
a remedy for unjust enrichment and claims for profits as a rough
Because
measure of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.'
the plaintiff and the defendant did not compete, 50 the court held that
any award of the defendant's profits would be a remedy for unjust
enrichment, not a proxy for actual damages.'s' In such cases, the
court held, a jury is not required.152 Distinguishing another case that
upheld a jury trial in somewhat similar circumstances, 53 the court
stated that profits are not always a proxy for the plaintiff's actual
damages and that, in the Second Circuit, one must carefully parse the
rationales underlying the request for the defendant's profits before

146. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 325 F. Supp. 2d 841, 851
(M.D. Tenn. 2004), rev'd on othergrounds, 423 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2005); Empresa Cubana
Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); G.A. Modefine
S.A. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 888 F. Supp. 44, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Am.
Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Alexanian, No. 95 Civ. 0205(RO), 1995
WL 580276, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1995); see also Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(arguing via dicta), affd on other grounds, 170 F.3d 449, 466 (4th Cir. 1999) (the Fourth
Circuit did not specifically address the disgorgement issue).
147. 123 F. Supp. 2d 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Although this case included a dilution claim,
for which the court specifically denied a jury trial, the holding on the dilution issue was
based on the lack of any evidence of willful intent to dilute or trade on the plaintiffs
reputation. Id. at 209-10. Thus, under the FTDA, only an injunction-clearly an equitable
remedy-was available. Id.
148. Id. at 206 (quoting George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1538).
149. Id. at 206-07.
150. Id. at 207. Although both companies sold cigars under the COHIBA trademark,
the plaintiff was a Cuban entity and, therefore, could not sell its cigars in the United
States. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 208.
153. Id. (distinguishing Ideal World Mktg., Inc. v. Duracell, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 334,33738 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
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determining whether a jury trial is required. 154 Other courts have
followed Empresa and held that disgorgement of profits in a trademark
action may be equitable.155
Apart from Empresa, the most significant case finding disgorgement
not to warrant a jury trial is G.A. Modefine S.A. v. Burlington Coat
Factory Warehouse Corp.,is' a case that did not involve a dilution
claim. Citing what it believed to be controlling Second Circuit precedent, the court held that a claim for defendant's profits was an equitable
claim and did not merit a jury."
Unfortunately, the court did not
engage in much discussion of the issue.15 1
On the other side are several cases (again, mostly infringement cases,
not dilution cases) in which district courts held that disgorgement was
a legal remedy and required a jury trial. In Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida
Ltd.,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio found that Congress's intent was to have the court, not a jury,
decide the issue of damages."6 o However, the court also recognized
that such intent cannot override the Seventh Amendment.6 1 In its
analysis, the court noted that because dilution is a recent cause of
action, "examining archaic English jurisprudence is of little benefit" in
determining jury trial rights. 6 2 Abandoning the search for an historical analogue and turning to the remedy, the court cited Dairy Queen for
the proposition that the defendant's profits are a remedy at law.16 3
However, it is significant that the Libbey case involved a claim for actual
damages as well as the defendant's profits, and therefore included a
clearly legal claim.164
Another case in which a court found profits to be legal, not equitable,
is Ideal World Marketing, Inc. v. Duracell, Inc.16 ' The case is signifi-

154. See id. at 206-07.
155. SPSS, Inc. v. Nie, No. 08 C 66, 2009 WL 2579232, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2009);
Juicy Couture, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7203 (DLC), 2006 WL 559675, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2006).
156. 888 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
157. Id. at 45-46 (citing George Basch Co., 968 F.2d 1532).
158. See id.; see also Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 1221
(LMM), 1993 WL 205043, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1993) (holding disgorgement is
equitable, analogizing it to constructive trust).
159. No. 3:98CV439, 1999 WL 684180 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 1999) (dilution claim not
included).
160. Id. at *1.
161. Id. at *2.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *3.
164.

Id.

165.

997 F. Supp. 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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cant in large part because it cites the same Second Circuit authority as
Modefine, while coming to a different result.166 Noting that the George
Basch case categorized profits into three different functions-unjust
enrichment, deterrence, and rough proxy for damages-the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that it was
not feasible to separate the functions distinctly." Further, the court
cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamilton-Brown Shoe as indicating
that profits were not independently equitable because the grant of profits
by a court of equity was said to require an independent equitable
jurisdictional basis."66 Thus, the court concluded that the remedy of
disgorging the defendant's profits was legal." However, in this case,
the two sides were competitors, and the defendant's profits could be seen
as a rough proxy for the plaintiff's actual damages, especially since the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant used the same trademark as the
plaintiff on its products."

Other district court cases also have concluded that disgorgement of the
defendant's profits is a legal remedy, though often with the accompanying finding that profits would constitute a rough proxy for actual
damages and therefore should be deemed a legal remedy on that
basis.'

More recent precedent appears to have vindicated the Empresa view,
7 the
at least in the Second Circuit. In Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis,"
Second Circuit upheld a jury trial denial on the grounds that all of the
monetary remedies sought, including a disgorgement of the defendant's
As the court explained, those remedies
profits, were equitable."7
would not be compensatory for losses suffered by plaintiff." Rather,
they represented "monies unjustly earned by" defendant."'75

166. Id. at 337.
167. Id. at 337-38.
168. Id. at 338-39.
169. Id. at 339.
170. Id. at 335.
171. Alcan Int'l, Ltd. v. S.A. Day Mfg. Co., 179 F.R.D. 398, 401-02 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(finding profits as rough proxy for damages); Daisy Grp., Ltd. v. Newport News, Inc., 999
F. Supp. 548, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Oxford Indus., Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
1648, 1654 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding profits more like compensation than restitution); see
also adidas-America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1087-88 (D.
Ore. 2008) (citing Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 477); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Accents, 994 F. Supp.
538, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
172. 469 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2006).
173. Id. at 299-300.
174. Id. at 299.
175. Id. at 300. Design Strategy was not a trademark case; it involved a breach of
fiduciary duty and unfair competition. Id. at 287-88. But cf Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys
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The courts upholding a jury trial right frequently cite Dairy Queen as
controlling precedent."' But Dairy Queen is a somewhat awkward
foundation upon which to build a generalized jury trial right in a
trademark case."' Dairy Queen at its core involved a contract, albeit
one to license the use of a trademark."' In Dairy Queen, the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant was in material breach of the contract, which
led to a trademark infringement due to the resulting unauthorized use
of the plaintiff's trademark."' Thus, the accounting requested by the
plaintiff would, at least in part, determine actual damages for breach of
the licensing agreement."
Although it is possible to read Dairy
Queen more broadly, the confusing nature of the complaint at issue,
coupled with the Court's later statements concerning the equitable
nature of claims for disgorgement of profits, counsel caution when
interpreting the reach of Dairy Queen.
Dairy Queen aside, there are difficult questions to confront concerning
the asserted lack of a jury trial right when a plaintiff asks that a
defendant's profits be disgorged. The Court's pronouncements concerning
the equitable nature of disgorgement indicate that such awards may be
deemed equitable, even if some of its language about restitution is
inconsistent with the Restatement. Moreover, the Court's opinion in
Sereboff points away from mandating a jury trial in cases seeking to
recover the defendant's profits, at least where those profits are not a
rough proxy for the plaintiff's actual damages.'"' A key element of the
Court's finding that the remedy was equitable in Sereboff was an ability
and willingness to trace funds unjustly held by the defendant (the
insured) that, equitably, belonged to the plaintiff (the insurance
company).'82 Because the funds paid to the defendant by the thirdparty tortfeasor, even if commingled with defendant's own funds, could

Corp., 551 F.3d 65, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2008) (declining to decide the issue and finding "[nlo
federal court of appeals decision which extensively discusses the issue").
176. Terry, 494 U.S. at 589; Daisy Group, LTD., 999 F. Supp. at 551; L.L. Bean, 629
F. Supp. at 646.
177. For an extended discussion of DairyQueen, see Thurmond, supra note 52, at 9-27,
108-114.
178. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 473-74.
179. See id. at 476-77 & nn.12-13. The majority of the Court seemed inclined to
construe the complaint as one for both breach of contract and trademark infringement; the
concurring opinion viewed it as trademark infringement. See id.
180. Id. at 479.
181. See 547 U.S. at 363-65.
182. Id.
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be "identified," this provided sufficient justification to impose a kind of
equitable trust on the funds for the benefit of the plaintiff.s3
The analogy in a dilution case would work as follows: The diluter, who
by statutory definition must either have intentionally sought to harm
the reputation of the plaintiff's mark or to have traded on the reputation
of the famous mark, unjustly appropriated plaintiff's mark for the
diluter's own purposes. The diluter garnered a profit by these efforts.
That profit represents a form of unjust enrichment to the diluter, and
not a compensatory loss to the plaintiff, because the plaintiff probably
cannot (and need not) demonstrate an actual loss or harm to the famous
mark." This is particularly true if the plaintiff and defendant are not
in any sort of competition, since defendant's gains would not represent
a loss of sales to the plaintiff. Therefore, the defendant is roughly in the
position of a fiduciary who embezzles property and invests it for her own
benefit, making a profit. An equitable trust would be imposed on such
profits for the benefit of the person whose property was wrongfully used,
even if the embezzler repaid the original amount taken." Thus, even
if there is no identifiable loss to the plaintiff, the profits made by the
diluter rightfully belong to the plaintiff. And those profits can be
identified (through records of sales) and traced to payments made to the
defendant, even if the funds now have been commingled with the
defendant's other funds. That would seem to make the recovery a
matter of equity, not law.
One difficulty is that the Court in Sereboff also noted that the case
involved an agreement between the parties."8 ' In a dilution claim,
although the "fund" could be identified as the profits gained by the
defendant, there normally would be no agreement between the parties
allocating the profits to the plaintiff. Nevertheless, recovery of a
defendant's profits appears to be based more on an unjust enrichment
theory than compensation.

183. Id. at 363-64.
184. Obviously, the wording of § 35(a) might be seen as a conceptual obstacle here.
Section 35(a), when discussing a court's authority to enhance the damage award, states
that such an enhancement must be "compensation and not a penalty." Lanham Act § 35(a),
15 § U.S.C. 1117(a). However, that phrase appears in the portion of the statute dealing
with enhanced damages, not the initial award of damages, which is still subject to the
"principles of equity." Id. Thus, it is not a technical obstacle.
185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 & illus. 4-5
(2011).
186. 547 U.S. at 365 (stating "no tracing requirement of the sort asserted by the
Sereboffs applies to equitable liens by agreement or assignment").
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As the foregoing

analysis indicates, deciding whether a jury trial is mandated is not a
simple task. However, certain principles lead to the conclusion that a
jury trial is not always required in dilution cases where money damages
are requested. Although the Supreme Court's precedents are less than
clear, there is a consistent theme that disgorgement of profits is
equitable (even if that conclusion is not always congruent with the
Court's rationale for separating law and equity). The decision in
Sereboff somewhat strengthens the argument in favor of judge trials by
designating a claim that is essentially for unjust enrichment as
equitable, at least where the damages will come from somewhat
identifiable proceeds received by a defendant that equitably belong to the
plaintiff. The long history of lower federal courts designating disgorgement of profits as an equitable remedy (although not under all circumstances) also supports this conclusion. The key principle seems to be
that a defendant's gains must be seen as an unjust enrichment at the
expense of the plaintiff. With that in mind, we can analyze the dilution
cause of action.
Courts must make a somewhat nuanced evaluation of the case before
deciding whether a jury trial is mandated. First, they must determine
whether the case involves dilution by blurring"' or dilution by tarnishment"', or even both. Start with a dilution by blurring case, where
damages may be awarded if a defendant intended to trade on the
reputation of the plaintiffs mark."' If a case involves competitors, a
court may presume, though not irrefutably, that an award of defendant's
profits would be a rough proxy for actual damages and a jury trial is
warranted.' 90 If the parties are competitors, there will either be
confusion, in which case the defendant's profits may be assumed to be
lost sales to the plaintiff, or no confusion. If the latter, but the parties

187. Dilution by "blurring," is defined as "association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the
famous mark." Lanham Act § 43(c(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)B).
188. Dilution by tarnishment is a separate form of dilution, which is defined as
"association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that harms the reputation of the famous mark." Lanham Act § 43(c)(2XC), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(2XC).
189. Lanham Act § 43(c)(5)(BXi), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX5XB)(i). Ironically, as mentioned
before, particularly where the diluting use is not an Internet domain name, it is very
common for successful dilution claims to be between competitors or near competitors. See
supra note 124.
190. Although the paradigm of dilution is a suit between noncompeting users, this is
not always true in practice. See supra note 124.
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are competitors (imagine a coffee house using the trademark NOT
STARBUCKS), because the statute allows damages only when defendant
intended to trade on the plaintiff's reputation, the defendant's profits
may be thought to result from a diversion of potential trade from the
plaintiff. The dilution claim requires a likely loss of distinctiveness
which, when applied to a competitor, may result in lost selling power,
exemplified by the defendant's sales. The correspondence is not perfect,
of course, but it seems preferable to err on the side of a jury trial here.
If the parties are not competitors-which is the archetypical dilution
case-then the basis for presuming the defendant's profits to be
compensation for the plaintiff's loss breaks down. Unless the second
user has gained a large following in a short time,' 9' an injunction
should repair the loss of distinctiveness (or uniqueness) within a fairly
short period, meaning that the plaintiffs loss of distinctiveness likely
will not have resulted in a quantifiable loss, and the actual loss is
probably de minimis. In that case, the defendant's profits from trading
on the plaintiff's reputation would represent unjust enrichment, not
unlike the unfaithful trust fiduciary whose gains are subject to an
equitable lien. In that case, a jury trial should not be mandated. 1 9 2
A tarnishment case presents different problems. Damages are only
permitted if the defendant intended to harm the reputation of the
plaintiff's trademark.9 a If the parties are competitors, one may
assume that the defendant's profits at least roughly correspond to the
harm to the plaintiff's reputation. As above, this assumption may not
be wholly accurate, but we can err on the side of granting a jury trial.
If the parties are not competitors, it is appropriate to assume a rough
correspondence between profits and harm. Although this seems to treat
tarnishment plaintiffs better than blurring plaintiffs,19 4 it is justified
in light of the statutory language. Although most tarnishment
defendants intend to trade on the reputation of the famous mark, that

191. One presumes that the case would be brought fairly soon after the offending use
begins or defendant may assert a laches defense. See generally 6 McCARTHY, supra note
52, § 31:1.
192. However, if the court deems a "reasonable royalty," not profits, to be the proper
measure of damages, it would represent a kind of compensatory damage. Famous
trademark owners do license their marks for goods and services unrelated to their core
businesses. Granting a reasonable royalty would compensate for a loss of distinctiveness
in the form of a loss of licensing power. On the other hand, defendant's profits would not
normally correspond to a reasonable royalty.
193. Lanham Act § 43(c)(5XB)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX5XBXii).
194. It gives them a choice of fact finders, and if jurors are seen as more plaintifffriendly, then it is an advantage. See infra Part V(C) for a discussion of several dilution
cases tried to a jury.
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is not the standard for awarding damages."' They are only available
in a tarnishment case if the defendant intends harm to the famous
mark's reputation."' Few tarnishment defendants actually intend to
harm the mark's reputation-that would seem to be self-defeating.
Moreover, the three statutory exclusions from dilution liability-fair use
in various circumstances, noncommercial use, and news reporting and
commentary- 1 97 will eliminate many tarnishing uses from consideration. Thus, the number of tarnishment cases that can justify a
damages award should be very small. Allowing a jury trial in the few
egregious cases of malicious tarnishment should not be a serious
problem, unless the jury is improperly instructed.'"
This analysis does not work for all cases. For example, a number of
recent dilution cases have involved counterfeiting."'
In reality,
counterfeiting is more of a reputation attack (tarnishment) than a
uniqueness attack (blurring). In theory, a counterfeiter should not want
to actually attack the reputation of the famous mark because that would
hurt the counterfeiter's business as well. But it is difficult to tell
whether courts are making this distinction because these claims are
usually coupled with a claim for ordinary infringement, which does not
have the intent to harm the reputation requirement.200 Counterfeiters
are competitors of the famous mark owner and, as such, their profits
may be seen as compensating for the plaintiff's losses on the assumption
that a sale by the defendant deprives the plaintiff of a sale.20' Even
if we assume that no confusion is involved and, therefore, that the
defendant's customers would not necessarily be the plaintiff's customers,

195. See Lanham Act § 43(cX5XB)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX5)(B)(ii).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 43(cX3)(A)-(C), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)-(C).
198. See infra Part V for a discussion of this issue.
199. See, e.g., Tiffany Inc. v. Ebay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 111-112 (2d Cir. 2010); Fendi
Adele S.R.L. v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 689 F. Supp. 2d 585, 598
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). I am putting aside the issue of whether counterfeiting is properly the
subject of dilution claims, since the object of a counterfeit is to confuse the consumer, not
to lessen the distinctiveness of the mark. Indeed, such dilution would make counterfeiting
less profitable. See WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp., supra note 4, at 386-87.
200.

See, e.g., Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 101.

201. This is not necessarily an accurate portrayal of the injury to a plaintiff. Many
purchasers are aware of the fact that they are buying a counterfeit and do so because they
cannot afford to buy a real one. Some, however, know that they are buying a counterfeit,
could afford to buy a genuine one, but choose to buy a good, lower priced counterfeit. Those
consumers do represent probable lost sales. Even confused consumers may not be potential
customers for the full priced goods. Nevertheless, the defendant's profits are at least a
rough proxy for damages, either for lost sales, or for reputational damage due to the poor
quality of the counterfeiter's goods.

460

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

we can infer a compensatory rationale for damages. Some of the
defendant's customers may have been attracted to the defendant's goods
by the association with the famous brand, which may be nonconfusing
but diverting nonetheless. And if the counterfeiting is of lower quality,
then there could be a subliminal loss of reputation, even if consumers
know they are buying a knock-off. Thus, at least in a very rough way,
monetary dilution claims against competitors may be deemed compensatory, and legal, rather than equitable. That, in turn, suggests a rather
simple means of mandating a jury trial-just ask for compensatory
damages. However, such damages will not always be provable, and if
this becomes obvious during discovery, a defendant may move to strike
the jury demand.202
IV.

BIFURCATING THE TASK: PART BY THE JUDGE AND PART BY THE
JURY?

Even assuming that jury trials are required in dilution cases, one can
posit an alternative to allowing a jury to decide all of the issues. In Tull
v. United States,203 the Supreme Court decided that, although a jury
was required to decide the issue of liability, a judge would decide how to
assess any penalties in the case (in other words, the judge determined
the proper remedy).204 Perhaps there are some issues in a dilution
case that should be decided by a judge, while others are properly the
province of the jury?
Such a bifurcation is not unique to Tul. In Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.,205 the Supreme Court held that in a patent case,
claim construction-that is, construing the scope of the patent claims-is
for the judge, while determining whether the patent was infringed is for
the jury.2 06 The Court invoked the familiar two-part test used in
Seventh Amendment20 7 caseS."' As to the first part-the historical
analogue-the Court stated that there was "no dispute that infringement
cases today must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than

202. See Overbeck Corp. v. Overbeck GMBH, No. 03 CV 0844 (DRH) (ETB), 2007 WL
1029025, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (quoting Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 367 F.
Supp. 2d 630, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
203. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
204. Id. at 426-27.
205. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
206. Id. at 372, 377.
207. U.S. CONsT. amend VII.
208. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376.
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two centuries ago."20 However, that did not end the discussion. The
Court went on to state as follows:
This conclusion raises the second question, whether a particular issue
occurring within a jury trial (here the construction of a patent claim)
is itself necessarily a jury issue, the guarantee being essential to
preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ultimate dispute. In
some instances the answer to this second question may be easy because
of clear historical evidence that the very subsidiary question was so
regarded under the English practice of leaving the issue for a jury. But
when, as here, the old practice provides no clear answer, . . . we are
forced to make a judgment about the scope of the Seventh Amendment
guarantee without the benefit of any foolproof test.210
Although the Court's first resort was to whatever historical analogues
existed to the particular issue in question (because claim construction as
we know it did not exist in 1791), it found no conclusive analogue.2 11
Thus, the Court was left to look at past precedent and to "consider both
the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the statutory
policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation."212 As to the
former, the Court noted that "[tihe construction of written instruments
is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better
than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis. ",21 In addition, the
Court cited "uniformity in the treatment of a given patent"2 "' as a
reason to leave the construction of claims to the judge, with the hope
that the first judge's construction would be followed as a matter of stare
decisis. 21 5 At the end of the day, patent cases present an example of
bifurcated fact finding. The judge is to decide the proper construction
of claims, while the jury determines issues of infringement.216
Is any issue in a dilution claim analogous to claim construction in
Markman? If so, the most likely candidate is the issue of whether
plaintiff has a famous mark. The original FTDA'" did not define the
term "famous"; it simply listed eight factors that courts could use to

§§

209. Id. at 377.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 384.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 388.
214. Id. at 390.
215. Id. at 391.
216. See id. at 372, 377.
217. FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
1125(c), 1127 (2006)).
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decide the issue."" Although this may look like an ordinary factual
issue, court opinions suggested otherwise. Some courts asserted that
famous marks had to be a "household name,"21 9 and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that "fame" for purposes
of a confusion inquiry was not the same as "famous" for dilution
eligibility. 220 This indicates that fame is a term of art, a legal term,
rather than a simple factual issue.
The amendments made by the TDRA in 2006221 make the argument
in favor of bifurcating the issue of fame much stronger. The TDRA
added a definition of a famous mark: to be famous, a mark must be
"widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States
as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's
owner."2 2 More to the point, the existence of a fairly particularized
definition makes the issue of fame look more like an interpretation of a
legal term of art than an issue of fact.
To a significant degree, the issue of a famous mark, as currently
defined, fits the structure of Markman.2 24 First, dilution itself was
unknown to the common law, although one could make analogies to
trademark law. 225 More important, however, the issue of a famous
mark is a specialized construct largely unknown to trademark law until
the advent of the federal dilution law. 2 26 In ordinary infringement
cases, a stronger mark will carry with it the ability to preclude its use

218. Id.

§

3(a), (c).

219. E.g., Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2002);
Vallavista Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
220. Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396
F.3d 1369, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
221. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) (2006)).
222. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2XA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006). This definition was
drafted to inject some clarity into the analysis of whether a mark is famous. Before the
TDRA, there were splits in the circuits as to the proper analysis of the issue. See
WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp., supra note 4, at 211-18, 226-27.

223. In Markman, the Court stated that when an issue "falls somewhere between a
pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has
turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question." 517 U.S.
at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
224.

See id.

225. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003).
226. The original group of state dilution laws did not require a famous mark, just a
"distinctive" one. See WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp., supra note 4, at 40-41.
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on a wider variety of goods and services.22' However, once a mark is
deemed "distinctive,"-that is, capable of distinguishing the goods of one
merchant from those of another-there is no added threshold for a mark
to claim protection from infringement. 228 Thus, "strength" is an issue
without real boundaries; it is more of a sliding scale in which strength
varies widely depending on context and historical facts.229 By contrast,
there is no dilution protection available under federal law unless a mark
is famous.2"o The term is binary in its effect. Although the term
famous has been used somewhat loosely in trademark law to provide
protection to certain trademarks that have not been used in the United
States but nevertheless claim protection from infringement'23 1 this
terminology is neither consistently defined, nor consistently used
internationally.2 2 The concept of a famous mark, as used in the
TDRA, is somewhat unique. Furthermore, it is a concept better suited
to interpretation by a judge than a jury. Because it is a threshold issue
and an artificial legal construct, lay understandings of the term famous
can lead a jury astray in the analysis. As was true with respect to claim
construction in Markman, it is also important that a mark be given a
uniform interpretation as being famous or not famous, at least at any
point in time, so that others can determine their potential liability under
the TDRA.2 33 A judge would be in a good position to determine the

227. The Federal Circuit has used the term "famous" to denominate marks with the
greatest scope of protection in the registration context. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (listing the "fame" of the mark as a factor). The
Federal Circuit is the successor court to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Brown
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 866 F. Supp. 439,444 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The court also has
distinguished fame in the likelihood of confusion context of registration-to determine the
scope of protection from fame in the dilution context, where it is a threshold requirement
for eligibility for protection. Palm Bay Imports, Inc., 396 F.3d at 1374-75.

228. See Nabisco v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogatedon
other grounds by Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433, as recognized in Louis Vuitton Malletier v.

Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 435 n.96 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
229.

See id.

230. See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
231. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 145, 157-160 (2d Cir. 2007); Grupo
Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004).
232. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, Mar. 20, 1883,
last revised July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 306, 325 (referring to "well-known" marks),
available at http://treaties.un.org; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS), pt. II, § 2, art. 16(2) (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-Ctrips-elt-agmO-e.htm (referring to "well-known" marks); see David S.
Welkowitz, Famous Marks Under the TDRA, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 983, 993-94 (2009).
233. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.,
317 U.S. 228, 236 (1996)) (noting that inconsistent claim construction could lead to a
reduction in publicly useful activity). Unlike the patent situation, where claim construction
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proper weight to give another court's determination that a mark is or is
not famous. Finally, the policy of the statute favors having a judge
make the determination of fame. The TDRA, like the FTDA, intended
to create a remedy for a very limited group of marks-those that are
famous."
It is important that dilution protection be cabined by a
strict interpretation of this requirement, lest it swallow up trademark
infringement as the general remedy for trademark violations.
On the other hand, it must be conceded that the analogy to patent
claim construction is a rough one at best. For one thing, the fluid nature
of mark fame means that uniformity cannot be as strongly enforced as
with patent claim construction."' Second, juries often determine a
lesser threshold issue in the confusion context, whether a mark is
distinctive and thus eligible for protection from infringement.2 37
Moreover, fame may be a mixed question of fact and law that could be
In theory,
determined by a jury, if the jury is properly instructed.3
if bounded by appropriate parameters, a jury could determine whether
a given mark fits the parameters.2 3 9 Thus, although bifurcation
provides a possible means of allocating the fact finding duties, it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court would bless such an arrangement.
V.

THE LARGER VIEW OF THE JUDGE-JURY DIVIDE

Regardless of the results of a Seventh Amendment2 4 o analysis, there
will continue to be jury trials in dilution cases. Dilution claims may be
appended to other claims, such as trademark infringement by confusion,

would be static, whether a mark is famous can be fluid. Thus, a mark that is not famous
at one point in time could later be found to be famous. And a mark that is famous at a
particular point in time could lose its status as a famous mark at a later point in time.
Nevertheless, one who wishes to make certain, nonconfusing uses of a mark would want
to know whether there was a potential for dilution liability-the first step for which would
be the existence of a famous mark.
234. See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
235. Recall that dilution, unlike ordinary infringement, does not require any showing
of likelihood of confusion, in many cases making it easier to establish than ordinary
infringement. See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727,
729 (D. Minn. 1998).
236. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
237.

See e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765-66 (1992).

238. See Big Boy Rest. v. Cadillac Coffee Co., 238 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870 (E.D. Mich.
2002).

239. The problems raised by the need for such construction are discussed infra Part V.
240. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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that carry a jury trial right,24 1 or the dilution plaintiff may ask for a
monetary remedy that is legal, not equitable.
In this section, we consider a larger question concerning the efficacy
of jury decision making in these cases. The question is whether jury
trials are inherently flawed decision-making vehicles in dilution cases
and, if so, what reasonable mechanisms exist to improve them or to limit
the scope of the problem. The issue discussed in this section is not
unique to dilution cases. However, dilution claims are a good illustration of the problem and, perhaps, of some solutions.
Juries are being asked to make decisions that are beyond the
institutional mandate of the jury. Juries are being asked to make legal
decisions, as well as factual ones, because legislators and judges are
unable, or unwilling, to draw legal boundaries in the statute and in jury
instructions.' As a result, the instructions given to jurors in dilution
claims are badly flawed. This is illustrated by the actual instructions in
several cases which will be examined in a later portion of this section.244 In the final subsection of this part of the article, I present a
proposed instruction on one element of the dilution claim-whether a
mark is famous-as one possible avenue of solving some of the problems
discussed here. But the nature of the problem, or problems, requires
further explanation.
The Information Gap Between Judge and Jury
Juries occupy a special place in civil litigation. We give their decisions
great deference,245 and courts often strive mightily to uphold jury
verdicts. But this deference creates serious flaws in the normative
landscape of dilution, as well as other areas of intellectual property law.

A.

241. The Supreme Court's holding in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover only requires
that the legal issues be tried to a jury first. 359 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1959). But a court could
choose to try all of the claims to a jury, even if it only considers the jury's findings to be
advisory on the nonlegal issues.
242. As noted earlier, where the parties are competitors, the defendant's profits may
be a rough proxy for actual damages and thus legal in nature. See George Basch Co. v.
Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1538-39 (2d Cir. 1992). Some of the examples in
subsection C of this Part would fall into this category.
243. See, e.g., Peter M. Tiersma, Asking Jurors to do the Impossible, Legal Studies
Paper No. 2009-12, at 21-25 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352093 (last
visited Sept. 1, 2011).
244. See infra Part V.C.
245. See Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1536) (indicating that the jury's verdict would be
upheld unless "there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the
jury's finding could only have been the result o[f] sheer surmise and conjecture"), rev'd on
other grounds, 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
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Moreover, the deference may be misplaced in dilution cases because
jurors are at a serious disadvantage in their decision-making due to a
paucity of important information.
The problem posed by deference to jury decisions can be illustrated by
considering the issue of a famous trademark in a dilution case. In order
to be eligible for federal dilution protection, a mark must be famous."'*
The federal statutory definition of a famous mark contains several
elements: a mark must be (1) "widely recognized," (2) "as a designation
of source," (3) "by the general consuming public of the United
States.""' At first blush, these elements appear to require factual
decisions, which are the usual province of a jury. In reality, however,
each of those elements contains an intermingling of fact and law,
because the definition is not tied to a lay understanding of the term
famous. 4 Instead, it is a legal limitation on the universe of eligible
marks.
The definition of a famous mark raises a number of difficult questions.
What do we mean by "widely recognized"? Must it be recognized in all
fifty states? Is it sufficient if a very substantial percentage of the
population recognizes it (and if, so, what is that percentage)?24 9 Also,
what constitutes the "general consuming public of the United States"?
Does this mean the mark must be known by young and old, rich and

246. Lanham Act § 43(cXl), (2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), (2)(A) (2006). Most state
dilution laws also require the protected mark to be famous, but the parameters governing
the decision about whether a mark is famous under most state laws are not identical to the
federal ones. See WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp., supra note 4, at 36-40. Thus, not all of the
problems discussed here are equally applicable to most state law dilution claims. On the
other hand, the prevalence of attaching supplemental state dilution claims to federal ones
presents a separate problem of jury confusion. When the same term-famous-has multiple
meanings in the same case, juries may not be able to separate the contexts of each decision.
247. Lanham Act § 43(cX2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). The dilution laws ofAlabama,
California, Mississippi, and Oregon contain a similar definition of a famous mark. ALA.
CODE § 8-12-17(b) (Supp. 2010); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14247(a) (West 2008); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-25-25(b) (2009); OR. REv. STAT. § 647.107(2) (2009). However, under these
state laws, marks need only be famous in the forum state to be eligible for dilution
protection. Indeed, a majority of state dilution laws now require a mark to be famous in
the state in order to be eligible for dilution protection, although most of the state laws do
not contain any definition of a famous mark. See WELKOWITZ, Dilution Supp., supra note
4, at 37-38.
248. Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 697
(W.D. Ky. 2010) ("'Fame' is a lexicon of art particular to trademark jurisprudence; it is not
at all the same thing as asking 'the man on the street' whether a name, mark or product
is 'famous.'").
249. It has been suggested that 75% is an appropriate threshold, but no court has so
held. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:106, at 24-293.
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poor, hip and not so hip, parents and people without children, and so
on?250
These types of questions raise two fundamental issues. First, which
questions raise issues of fact and which raise issues of law? Although
in some ways the statutory definition raises factual questions, the
questions just posed are normative questions about the intended reach
of the statute. If they are normative questions, then they are not
questions that should be answered case by case, depending on context.
They are questions that should have a consistent answer in all

cases. 25 1
The fact/law question will be explored in more depth in subsections B
and D. For the purposes of the current discussion, we will assume that
the question of fame is a fact-finding question, and examine the problem
of jury decision-making in that context. Although juries are commonly
trusted as fact finders, there are significant differences in capacity and
information between judges and juries that could materially affect the
Consider a typical dilution case decided by a
ultimate decision.
judge and assume that we are either having a final bench trial or, more
likely, either a summary judgment motion or a motion for a preliminary
injunction. In these latter two situations, of course, the standards of
proof are not identical to a bench trial.25 In each situation the judge

250. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1600, 1611
(T.T.A.B. 2010) (noting that Coach's evidence did not indicate the level of awareness of the
mark among men).
251. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213-14 (noting effects of unclear boundaries
in trade dress cases). It is also important that a lay definition of famous not be substituted
for the statutory one, lest the cabining of dilution intended by the requirement of fame be
undone by an overly broad universe of eligible marks.
252. This is not to say that judges are necessarily the best fact finders. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away from Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to
the Deciders, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 353-60 (2010) (noting many imperfections in judicial
decisions, factual and legal).
253. A preliminary injunction can issue if there is a likelihood of success on the merits
and if the equities favor granting a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co.
v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed.
Express, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is a fairly stringent
standard, in theory looking only to see whether there is any genuine issue of material fact
to be tried. See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc, 618
F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135,
1140 (9th Cir. 2002)) (holding that summary judgment in trademark cases is disfavored).
But cf Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002) (indicating
that trademark cases may be "amenable to summary judgment in appropriate cases"). If
there is such an issue, then summary judgment must be denied, even if the side opposing
the motion has a weak case. See 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY K.
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§

2725 (3d ed. 1998).
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must apply the applicable legal principles to a specific set of facts. For
example, a judge (like a jury) would have to decide whether the evidence
demonstrates that the plaintiff's mark is "widely recognized by the
general consuming public."254 On what can the judge draw for assistance when making these decisions? All federal judges can (and
certainly do) consult written judicial opinions in other trademark cases,
whether by district judges or appellate panels. In trademark law, and
intellectual property law in general, there are more opportunities for
appellate review and interpretation of the law than in garden variety
tort cases, for a very simple reason. Litigants in trademark cases
typically request a preliminary injunction to stop the alleged infringement as soon as possible.255 Often the preliminary injunction motion
is the most critical juncture of the case, and may end it. Although a
decision on a preliminary injunction is interlocutory, the grant or denial
of the motion is immediately appealable.2 " Thus, appellate courts
hear a relatively large number of such appeals. 27 These appellate
opinions do more than simply espouse general legal principles. They
must apply the law to a given set of facts, providing an effective
database with which a district judge can compare the current set of
facts. Much the same is true of district court opinions, though with less
precedential force. The various opinions do more than draw legal
boundaries; they give the judge some idea of how different sets of facts
fit within the boundaries. Thus, the result in a case-accepting or
rejecting a claim of fame-and the application of both the definition and
factors that guide decisions about a famous mark in a particular

254. Lanham Act § 43(cX2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2)(A). The statute contains four
factors to assist the court in making this determination:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the
mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered
under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id. § 43(cX2)(AXi)-(iv), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2)(AXi)-(iv). But the factors are open ended and
not prioritized.
255. See, e.g., TCPIPHolding, 244 F.3d at 92.
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006).
257. The standard of review for factual matters is technically a strict one, but appellate
courts are not shy about reversing district courts in these cases. See, e.g., Libman Co. v.
Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1361-63 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing district court's
analysis); id. at 1364-68 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of ignoring the clearly
erroneous standard of review). But cf Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698
F.2d 786, 793, 790-96 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying clearly erroneous standard).
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situation (for example, by finding certain levels of advertising to be
weighted positively, negatively, or neutrally in the analysis of fame) will
give guidance in the next case. Furthermore, many judges, particularly
those sitting in districts such as the Southern District of New York, the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago), or the Central and Northern
Districts of California (Los Angeles and San Francisco), see a relatively
large number of trademark cases. Those judges can rely on their own
experience with trademark cases to assist them. In sum, a district judge
has a large database of examples of the application of the law to specific
factual situations, which can provide useful bases for comparison with
the case before the court.
In addition, the district judge may consult secondary sources, such as
law review articles and treatises, as well as the actual legislative history
of the statute, giving further context to the language and purpose of the
statute. Thus, even without formal guidance from the statute or
appellate decisions, a district judge has a wealth of information available
to guide the decision-making process for each element of the dilution
claim.
Jurors, by contrast, have none of these supplemental aids. With no
prior knowledge or experience in this area they must make a decision
guided only by the judge's instructions, which may not give very much
context or guidance to the decision they are about to make.2 " Although they may be given examples,"' it would be impossible to make
the same breadth of material available to juries that is available to
judges.
Now consider the composition of the jury. Juries are drawn from one
locale-they may not even be representative of the state, let alone the
United States."o It would not be surprising if jurors used their own
experiences to evaluate fame. But their experiences may not be
representative of the "general consuming public.""' There could be
surveys introduced into evidence, which would be more representative,
as well as advertising figures from other areas of the country. But they
are not required.2 6 2 Jurors have no idea about the relationship of
"strong" marks in the infringement context (about which they may have

258. See infra Part V.C for an examination of several examples of jury instructions on
the issue of fame.
259. See Roselle L. Wissler, Patricia F. Kuehn, & Michael J. Sacks, InstructingJurors
on GeneralDamages in PersonalInjury Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 712, 719 (2000)
(discussing proposals to give juries examples to aid deliberations on the issue of damages).
260. Judges, of course, are not representative, either, but their large database of
precedent and experience with trademark cases makes a wide perspective available.
261. See Lanham Act § 43(cX2XA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2XA).
262. Perhaps they should be, at least in a jury trial.
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been instructed in the same case) and "famous" ones in the dilution
context.263 And this represents only one facet of the jury's decision in a
dilution case. How different facts interact in a given case-some pointing
one way, some another-makes the decision more complicated. Judges
can consult similar cases, but juries cannot.
If we move to the issue of likelihood of dilution, the problem is equally
prevalent. If we consider dilution by blurring, the questions are whether
the defendant's mark causes an "association" between its mark and the
famous one, whether that association is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark, and whether the defendant intended to trade
on the reputation of the famous mark.2 64 Although the statute lists six
factors for decision makers to use to answer the first two questions
(relating to impairment of distinctiveness), as with the issue of fame, the
statute does not specify the relative importance of any factor and, in
fact, indicates that there is no mathematical formula for deciding the
question and even that the factors are not mandatory.2 1 Moreover,
because the factors are indirect measures of dilution, their applicability
varies with context. As with fame, a judge can compare the present case
with published cases to see how other courts have assessed similar fact
situations. If she wishes, the judge can consult secondary sources, such
as law reviews and treatises. Jurors cannot consult any of these
additional sources of information. And, because dilution is a concept
with which few, if any, jurors (not to mention judges) will have had
experience, having examples of different factual contexts in which
dilution was and was not found is extremely important.16
Thus, in the fact-finding process, the jury is at a decided disadvantage.
Lacking relevant experience,267 the jury is not supplied with the

263. See Lanham Act § 43(cX2), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2) (discussing famous mark); Accu
Pers., Inc. v. AccuStaff, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (D. Del. 1993) (discussing strong
marks). In theory, a judge could instruct the jury on some of these issues with greater
specificity. However, as discussed later in subsections C and D, this does not happen in
actual cases.
264. See Lanham Act § 43(cX2XB), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2)(B) (2006).
265. See id. § 43(cX2XBXi)-(vi), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(BXi)-(vi). The statute says that
"the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following [six factors]." Id.
266. By contrast, the mental state constituting confusion can be presented to jurors in
a manner that allows their personal experience to have relevance. No doubt they all have
been confused at one time or another. Similarly, the question of intent to trade on
another's reputation, which is required for a damage award, see Lanham Act § 43(c)(5), 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5) (2006), is a matter that is more likely to be similar to some experiences
of at least some of the jurors.
267. In a garden variety tort or contract case, jurors usually have relevant experiences,
at least at some level of generality. See infra Part V.D.
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factual context that judges have and that can assist the decision-making
process.
But there is a larger problem lurking in the background. In the
decision about fame, a jury needs to answer the three basic questions
posed in the definition: is it (1) widely recognized; (2) as a designation
Unfortunately, those
of source; (3) by the general consuming public.'
questions are very open-ended. Judicial opinions and the statutory
factors have delineated the boundaries of those questions somewhat, but
the limited purview of summary judgment, combined with court
pronouncements that seem to discourage its use,' may put pressure
on trial judges to allow cases to go to a trial (before a judge or jury).
In theory, at trial, the judge should provide the necessary legal
parameters to the jury. However, as we shall see, this is not the
case.27 0 The issue of fame requires additional legal parameters if the
basic questions are to be answered accurately: Is there a minimum level
of recognition that comports with being "widely recognized"? Is there a
required level of diversity of the public to constitute the "general
consuming public"? And what do we mean by a "designation of
source"?27 ' The definition also has a history, which is important when
deciding which marks are famous. The current definition was a reaction
to the decisions of courts under the original federal statute which, most
notably, split on the issue regarding whether marks were eligible for
dilution protection if they were famous only within a limited product
market (with a limited pool of consumers)-so-called "niche fame."272
The definition of a famous mark in the TDRA... was intended to
eliminate niche fame, but the statute only says that indirectly.274 In
addition, the original dilution statute contained no definition of a famous
mark but listed eight guiding factors.'
The TDRA contains a some-

268. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
269. See Fortune Dynamic, Inc., 618 F.3d at 1031 (quoting Entrepreneur Media v.
Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007)) (disfavoring summary judgment in trademark
cases).
270. See infra Part V.C. If there is a bench trial, the court must issue findings of fact
and conclusions of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 52. The appellate court's review of conclusions of
law is de novo, but it must uphold the findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(aX6).
271. See Lanham Act § 43(cX2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2XA).
272. See WELKOWITz, Dilution Supp., supra note 4, at 304-13.
273. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
274. E.g., Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 2007);
Maker's Mark Distillery,Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
275. See FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98 § 3(c)(1)(A)-(H), 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).
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what specific definition and only four factors.17' All of this history is
relevant to the proper application of the statutory definition. Judges can
look to court opinions and legislative history for assistance when
applying the definition; juries look to the trial judge's instructions. If
there are gaps in the instructions, then juries must fill in the gaps
themselves. If these are deemed simply fact gaps, then the information
gap just discussed is the main problem. However, if these are normative
questions about where lines ought to be drawn, then we are asking
juries to make legal decisions, not factual ones.
Similarly, the questions to be answered when oonsidering the
likelihood of dilution contain many gaps. How do we know whether an
"association" between the second mark and the famous mark will
"[impair] the distinctiveness" of the famous mark?277 The statute lists
six factors to consider, but gives them no context. 2 78 How much actual
association is relevant-if only ten percent of the public makes an
association, is that enough? Does the association have to be widespread
or can it be confined to a single type of consumer? Does inherent
distinctiveness count more than acquired distinctiveness in blurring?27 9
Should intent be decisive if intent to create an association is found?28 o
In reality, this may be the most important question: Are these purely
factual questions, or are they really legal questions?
To some degree, these questions can be illuminated by jury instructions. Of course, that assumes that there are helpful judicial opinions
available to be used in the formation of instructions.
In addition,
summary judgment can set the outer limits of a jury's domain-at some
point, the record does not allow a finding of fame and/or dilution, and at
some point, fame and dilution exist as a matter of law. However,
summary judgment is a very crude tool for drawing lines. Courts are
discouraged from granting summary judgment, and trial judges often
deny summary judgment because the standard is fairly strict.282 Thus,

276. Lanham Act § 43(cX2XAXi)-(iv), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cXA)(2)(i)-(iv).
277. See id. § 43(c)(2XB), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
278. See id. § 43(cX2XBXi)-(vi), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2)(BXi)-(vi).
279. See Nat'1 Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1497
(T.T.A.B. 2010) (focusing its dilution analysis primarily on inherent distinctiveness, rather
than acquired distinctiveness).
280.

See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark

Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006) (noting that intent to cause confusion
tends to be decisive in infringement cases).
281. See discussion infra Part V.D.
282. 10A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 253, § 2712 ("summary judgment must
be used with a due regard for its purposes and should be cautiously invoked so that no
person will be improperly deprived a trial of disputed factual issues"); see id. § 2725. See
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the parameters within which the ultimate fact finder operates, be it
judge or jury, are very broad. In effect, this cedes to the fact finder
much of the normative line drawing.
The consequence is a huge information gap between a judge and a
jury. The information gap has two dimensions: (1) a lack of factual
reference from which to draw factual conclusions, and (2) a lack of legal
reference points from which to make both factual decisions and, when it
is left to the trier of fact, making decisions about where the statute's
legal boundaries may lie. It is difficult to believe that this information
gap is not significant when it comes to decision-making in a fairly
technical (in the legal sense) area.
The Law-Fact Divide and the Example of Fame
As the above discussion makes clear, the problem with jury decisionmaking in dilution cases presents both fact determination issues and
normative line-drawing issues. It is the second of these with which this
subsection is concerned. To what extent are the elements of dilution
really legal issues, not factual issues? The normal judge-jury divide is
a legal-factual one.2 83 If the issue to be decided is legal, then it is for
the judge to decide, not a jury. Again, we will focus on the element of
fame in a dilution case to illustrate the problem, though other elements
of the dilution claim raise similar concerns. The issue of fame and the
legal parameters that guide the decision are particularly important
because fame is a gatekeeper in dilution analysis. If too many marks
are allowed through the gate, then the careful balance that Congress
struck between granting some marks special protection and ensuring
that dilution does not supplant ordinary infringement will be disrupted.
A jury has no knowledge of this balance or of the gatekeeping function.
It decides the case before it in a vacuum. It may be tempting to send
the issue of fame to a jury because of the factual overtones of the
decision. Certainly the decision to find a mark famous sounds like an
issue of fact. But experience indicates that this is not really the case;
the issue of fame involves an interplay of legal norms and historical
facts. Furthermore, as indicated in the previous section, the legal norms
are not completely expressed in the statutory language.m
The problem that this presents in trademark cases was discussed in
an opinion by Judge Jon 0. Newman of the Second Circuit, dissenting
B.

also

11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIL [ 56.24[2] (3d ed.
2011); ef id.
56.24[3] [al (noting difficulties distinguishing law and fact).
283. See generally James B. Thayer, "Law and Fact"in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV.
147 (1890) (classical discussion of the divide).

284. See Lanham Act § 43(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2) (2006).
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in Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 2 85

[Vol. 63
The Wal-Mart

case, which eventually went to the Supreme Court,2 86 involved a claim
of trade dress infringement, where the alleged protectable trade dress
was the design of the clothing manufactured by the plaintiff.287 A jury
decided that the trade dress was "inherently distinctive" and therefore
protectable, and the majority upheld that finding.288 In a portion of
his dissent, Judge Newman delineated the detriments of giving juries too
much leeway in certain types of cases:
Every jury verdict is entitled to a fairly high degree of deference
regardless of the nature of the issue decided. To state that proposition,
however, does not preclude recognition of the principle that the
boundaries within which an issue is reasonably a fact issue for a jury
are narrower in some contexts than in others. When juries are called
upon to resolve conflicting versions of historical facts, the boundaries
are fairly wide. Reviewing courts take a generous view of what a
reasonable jury could conclude with respect to historical facts, such as
what happened at the scene of an accident. But the broad range of
reasonable fact-finding as to historical facts and familiar legal issues
like negligence is not appropriate for issues infused with technical legal
meaning, issues with which juries are almost completely unfamiliar.
When reviewing courts consider jury verdicts on such issues as the
reasonableness of a challenged restraint of trade or the protectability
of a trade dress, I believe reviewing courts should recognize that the
boundaries in which jury fact-finding may permissibly occur are
somewhat narrow. It is not a matter of giving less deference to a jury's
fact-finding, reached within an allowable scope. Rather, it is a matter

of recognizing that the scope of allowable fact-finding is narrower.
When the issue is negligence, many combinations of fact patterns can
reasonably be found in the typical contested case, and juries have wide
latitude to determine what they think the facts were and thereby to
find either that there was negligence or there was not. But on more
esoteric issues, courts should recognize that there are fewer combinations of fact patterns that could reasonably be found in a given case,
and should therefore somewhat narrow the range in which jury factfinding is permissible. Otherwise, we are ceding to juries broad

285.

165 F.3d 120, 133-37 (2d Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting in part), rev'd on other

grounds, 529 U.S. 205.

286. Wal-Mart Stores, inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, rev'g 165 F.3d 120. The
Supreme Court did not discuss the issue presented in the portion of Judge Newman's
dissent that is reproduced below. See id.
287. Wal-Mart, 165 F.3d at 123 (majority opinion).
288. Id. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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authority to determine the substantive scope of the law on topics such
289
as antitrust, copyright, trademark, and, in this case, trade dress.
Judge Newman's observations could be criticized as making unwarranted assumptions both about jury capabilities and about the scope of
possible fact patterns in a given trademark case. However, there are
two points in his remarks that have particular salience to this discussion. His last comment, that giving a wide berth to jury decisions
effectively "ced[es] . . . broad authority to determine the substantive

One interprescope of the law," goes directly to the law-fact divide.'
tation of this comment is that many of the decisions labeled "factual" are
really heavily infused, explicitly or implicitly, with normative limits, and
those limits are not made known to juries. A related interpretation, or
perhaps a corollary, is that many factual issues, such as whether a mark
is famous for dilution purposes, are either purely legal issues or a
mixture of fact and law, in a manner approximating the issue of
negligence in an ordinary tort case, but of a kind that does not lend itself
to resolution by a jury.
This leads to his second point, about the "allowable scope" of jury fact
finding. 9' Taking the issue of fame as an example, the allowable
scope of fact finding-by either a judge or a jury-is circumscribed by the
statutory definition of a famous mark. 292 Thus, the fact finder cannot
simply rely on a lay understanding, or a dictionary definition, of
fame.29 3 However, the statutory definition, as we have discussed,
includes some poorly defined parameters, such as "widely recognized."294 Because the issue is not whether the mark is famous in a
lay historical sense, but whether the mark is famous in the limited sense
intended by the statute, it is up to the courts to give meaning to the illdefined terms and phrases. This recognizes the appropriate division of
labor between judge and jury. The jury determines the historical facts
and then fits them into the normative framework provided by the judge.
The fact-finding mission of the jury is necessarily limited to those facts
necessary to fill in the factual gaps in the legal framework. Thus, in the
case of fame, the jury would decide, as a matter of historical fact, what
percentage of the population had heard of the mark,2 95 how widely

289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 135-36 (footnotes omitted) (Newman, J., dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 135.
See Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2XA).

293.

Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d at 697.

294. Lanham Act § 43(cX2XA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2)(A).
295. The mark also must be famous prior to the time when the unauthorized use
began. Id. § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
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geographically dispersed that group is, and what subgroups within the
population were aware of the mark, as well as at what percentages each
subgroup was aware.296 However, in order to know whether a mark
is famous, the jury must be given a framework of legal relevance-what
range of percentages are significant, what geographic dispersal is
required, how many subgroups must be aware to constitute the "general
consuming public," etc.2" In theory, that arrangement would appear
to satisfy Judge Newman's criteria.2 98 However, in reality, the legal
framework given to a jury is nothing like the one just posited. The
question, then, is whether it is legitimate to give the jury a fairly
skeletal legal framework and then review its conclusions under a
deferential standard of review that effectively assumes that the jurors
were aware of the unstated nuances of the statutory language.
Of course, as Judge Newman concedes, in an ordinary negligence case
we allow the jury to decide the issue of negligence notwithstanding the
fact that the decision implicates a normative function: what should a
"reasonable person" do under the circumstances.a"0 The question is
why an issue like fame should be treated differently. One answer may
be that when we delegate the normative function to the jury, we do so
on the assumption that the jurors' ability to draw a proper normative
line is comparable to that of a court or a legislature. In the usual
negligence case, there are few "unseen" normative lines which would
materially alter the parameters of a jury's deliberations if they were
known. Although a jury might find it informative to know how other
juries decided similar cases, it is assumed not to be material, and we
assume that it would not send inappropriate messages about proper
behavior to the general public if the results are not congruent from case
to case.30'
By contrast, when deciding an issue like fame, there are a number of
unseen normative limits of which a jury would be unaware, and which
would materially alter the parameters of its deliberations. The simplest
example is the concept of niche fame, which was supposed to have been
eliminated by the TDRA.302 If a jury is not aware of this limit, which

296.
297.
298.
299.

See id. § 43(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(AXi)-(iv).
See id. § 43(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2)(A).
See Wal-Mart, 165 F.3d at 135-36 (Newman, J., dissenting).
In Judge Newman's view this would be an abdication of the judicial role. See id.

300.

Id. at 135.

301. Indeed, this may be viewed as desirable because a vague line keeps behavior
(mostly) at a reasonable distance from the line dividing legal from illegal conduct, whereas
a clear line allows one to go up to the edge of the line.
302. E.g., Haynes Int'l, Inc. v. Electralloy, No. 04-197E, 2009 WL 789918, at *18 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 24, 2009); Am. Mensa, Ltd. v. Inpharmatica, Ltd., No. WDQ-07-3283, 2008 U.S.
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is only indirectly expressed in the language of the statute, it could easily
ignore an important legal limit on its decision-making. But because
fame is viewed as a factual matter, courts may be tempted to give only
cursory review to the jury's decision, upholding it if it is at least
"reasonable."0 3 Similarly, although the statute formally includes the
existence of a federal registration as a factor favoring fame, it is actually
a minor boost at best."o4 Although the existence of registration is a
fact, the weight it is given is really a matter of the legal effect of
registration on the issue of fame, and an uninformed jury probably
However, a
would misinterpret its legal weight in the decision.'
reviewing court would not necessarily reverse just because the jury was
not informed that the weight to be accorded federal registration is small.
Moreover, the absence of normative congruence has a significant effect

Dist. LEXIS 99394, at *35 (D. Md. Nov. 6, 2008); Bd. of Regents, The Univ. of Tex. Sys. v.
KST Elec., Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 662, 678 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (magistrate judge opinion
adopted by the district court); ComponentOne, L.L.C. v. ComponentArt, Inc., No. 0205
cv1122, 2008 WL 4302108, at * 2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2007); Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v.
Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 05 C 1171, 2007 WL 2875232, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2007)
(noting that, prior to the TDRA, the Seventh Circuit accepted niche fame); PBI
Performance Prods., Inc. v. NorFab Corp., No. 05-4836, 2007 WL 2677627 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
3, 2007) (discussing niche fame in subsection IV). The House also thought that it
eliminated niche fame. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 8 (2005), reprintedin 2006 U.S.S.C.A.N.
1091, 1096-97.
303. See Super Duper, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 382 F. App'x 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 2009)) (upholding jury verdict).
One might question how the court concluded that the verdict was "reasonable" without
resorting to any of the normative limits on the jury's decision. See id.
304. See Lanham Act § 43(cX2)(AXiv), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(AXiv). Courts have cited
registration, or lack thereof, but it has not been a dispositive factor. See, e.g., Big Boy
Rests. v. Cadillac Coffee Co., 238 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Pocono Int'l
Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Mountain Speedway, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 427, 444 (M.D. Pa.
2001) (citing registration); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., No. IP 97-1682
C M/S, 2000 WL 1428665, at *17 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 30,2000) (holding that lack of registration
"weighs against finding famousness, although it alone is not dispositive"); Wash. Speakers
Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 504 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("The
conclusion that 'Washington Speakers Bureau' is not famous is bolstered by WSB's failure
to register. . . ."), affd on othergrounds,217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2000); Hershey Foods Corp.

v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 517 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that failure to register weighs
against fame); Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (D. Haw. 1996).
305. This is particularly true of the factor of registration. Most registered marks are
not famous, and there is no inherent reason why registration makes it more likely that a
mark is famous, although most famous marks probably are registered. However, an
unguided jury may overemphasize the importance of registration.
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on the behavior of trademark owners, and that effect may be undesirable."'
An additional argument that fame is different than negligence is
rooted in the different normative judgments required in each instance.
Generally speaking, making normative judgments is a matter for judges
and legislators. Juries are empanelled to adjudicate historical facts.
This is consistent with the nature of a jury as a one-time tribunal,
constituted solely to examine a single case and determine what
happened in that case. The trial process is oriented toward this onetime nature, by focusing the evidence on what is relevant to the
particular case, not the wider normative aspects of the case.30 When
a jury enters the realm of normative judgments, it is straying from its
institutional competence. Normative judgments are, or ought to be, the
product of a consideration of a wide range of experiences, often far afield
from the case at hand, so that the policy is a result of an accumulation
of different experiences that gives the decision maker sufficient data
from which to make an informed policy choice. Legislators invoke this
process when they hold hearings on proposed legislation, where they
may also be provided data by various interested groups. Judges invoke
the process in several ways. As discussed in the previous section, they
have access to the reports of other cases, giving them a larger database
from which to evaluate the effects of a particular normative decision. To
the extent that judges hear significant numbers of these types of cases,
they have their own data set from which to draw.o" Finally, through

306. It could lead to an excessive number of lawsuits claiming dilution if trademark
owners think they can defeat a motion for summary judgment. See infra text accompanying notes 319-22.
307. See William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction)in
the Interpretationof Written Contracts, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 931, 932-33 (arguing that the
fact/law distinction turns on particularity versus generality: if the matter is particular to
this case, it is one of fact). This is not to say that trials never include evidence of the wider
significance of the issues, but the scope of relevance in a typical civil case-that is, one that
is not aimed at institutional reform, for example-will limit the admissible facts to ones
focused more on the situation at hand. But see Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courtsand
Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 882-83 (2002) (noting that cigarette litigation began
to flourish when lawyers introduced evidence of societal harm from smoking).
308. Here, I wish to draw a distinction between the advantages of a judge using his or
her experience to make normative judgments and the perceived advantages-which may be
ephemeral or even disadvantageous-of having a judge make factual and credibility
judgments in individual cases based on experience. See Barbara A. Spellman, On the
Supposed Expertise of Judges in EvaluatingEvidence, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNumbra 1,
7-8 (Mar. 2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/respones/03-2007/Spellman.pdf (suggesting
that judges will not be better than, and may in some ways be worse than, juries in
evaluating facts and that expertise may lead to "inflexibility" in thinking).
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the vehicle of amicus curiae briefs and legislative history, judges have
access to the kind of data provided to legislators. Fame requires an
understanding of the legal world outside of the case before the court.
Jurors, by contrast, would be forced to make policy based on a data set
consisting only of one case. That is hardly the sort of representative
sampling that makes for good policy choices. But, one might point out,
we do allow juries to make normative judgments in negligence cases;
how is fame (or dilution) different? After all, we allow juries to
determine the contours of negligence in cases large and small. Although
many negligence cases are relatively simple, others are complex, so
simplicity cannot be the basis for a distinction. Nor can the size of the
potential judgment be critical, because many negligence cases lead to
very large judgments. Focusing on the issue of fame for dilution
purposes, one can explain the difference by the intended effect of
historical facts on the ultimate decision, and by the type of normative
judgment demanded in a negligence case. Juries are instructed that
negligence is a failure to act as a reasonable person should under the
particularcircumstances of the case.a' How does a jury decide what
actions were or were not reasonable under the circumstances?..o
First of all, because the standard is focused on the circumstances of
the case, it is particularized in that context. When it comes to negligence, even if the jury agrees about the basic historical facts, there may
be room for disagreement about whether those facts create a violation-that is, whether defendant's actions were unreasonable under the
circumstances. For example, it may be agreed that the defendant was
driving under the speed limit but was looking in the rear view mirror at
the moment that the plaintiff, who signaled for a lane change, moved
into the lane in front of defendant's car. The defendant looked down but
there wasn't enough time or room to slow sufficiently, and the defendant
rear-ended the plaintiff's car. All of the "historical facts" can be agreed
upon. However, allocating fault is another matter, and we are willing
to leave this to a jury because the law provides no solution to the issue.
It is a normative judgment, but one that we believe can be made as well
by the jury as by the judge. Although a negligence decision has effects
beyond the particular case, the actual legal interpretation is really
limited to those facts. However, in the case of fame, the jury must
formulate a global interpretation of the statute in order to make a
decision.

309. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Catlett, 177 F. 71, 76 (4th Cir. 1910).
310. Some might argue that, because the judgment of reasonableness applies only to
a single case, there are sufficient grounds to allow the jury to decide the issue. See
Whitford, supra note 307, at 933-34.
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The particularization can be illustrated by jury instructions and
supporting case law in negligence cases. In California, juries are
instructed as follows: "A person is negligent if he or she does something
that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation.""' They are further instructed that "You must decide how a
reasonably careful person would have acted in [name of plainThe supporting authority for this
tiff/defendantl's situation."312
instruction states that the California Supreme Court has called this
standard "inherently situational," and further, that "the amount of care
deemed reasonable in any particular case will vary, while at the same
Moretime the standard of conduct itself remains constant . ..
over, even in more complex cases, the essential standard is not
materially different. Thus, in professional negligence cases-for example,
legal malpractice-jurors are told to judge negligence by looking at "the
skill and care that a reasonably careful [insert type of professional]
would have used in similar circumstances."3 14 In a strict liability
action for defective design, where, in theory, "negligence" is not the
issue, the California jury is instructed to use a "Risk-Benefit Test" that
weighs the potential harm and the likelihood of its occurrence against
the feasible existing alternatives, the costs of the alternatives, and the
disadvantages of the alternatives.a"' Although it does not use the word
"negligence," this standard is also situational, much the same as an
ordinary negligence case.
Contrast this with the issue of fame. Assume that the plaintiff has
spent $10 million advertising its ZOWIEWOWIE mark in the Northeast,
Far West, Texas, and the upper Midwest (Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio,
northern Illinois and northern Indiana) on television and in various local
newspapers. Seventy-five percent of men eighteen and older and thirty
percent of women of the same age group have heard of the mark. Only
forty percent of the nonwhite population of those areas has heard of the
mark. Is ZOWIEWOWIE famous? Here, the question is whether the
mark is "widely recognized . . . by the general consuming public of the

311. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CACI) No. 401
(2011), availableat http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/2011-Edition.pdf.
312. Id.
313. Id. Sources & Auth. (quoting Flowers v. Torrance Mem. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 884 P.2d
142, 144 (Cal. 1994)).
314. Id. No. 600.
315. Id. No. 1204.
316. See Lambert v. Gen. Motors, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1185 (1998) ("Where liability
depends on the proof of a design defect, no practical difference exists between negligence
and strict liability; the claims merge."); see also Whitford, supra note 307, at 932.
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United States.""' This, in turn, depends on the proper interpretation
of that statutory language. If fewer than half of minorities and women
recognize the mark, is that sufficiently representative of the general
consuming public? How widely recognized does the statute require? In
theory, a proper statutory interpretation would answer those questions.
But the instructions in several dilution cases discussed below give no
guidance, leaving the statutory interpretation to the jury. However,
unlike the car accident, where we are content to leave the question of
unreasonable conduct under the circumstances to a jury, a question of
statutory interpretation should be for a judge. And unlike the negligence situation, the statute, properly interpreted, should answer the
question fairly definitively once the basic historical facts are determined.
Fame requires a jury to imagine whether the mark is widely
recognized outside of the context of any single case. In addition, the
jurors would use their collective experiences of similar or at least
analogous circumstances. Thus, the decision about what constitutes
negligent behavior is not based solely on a single case, but on the life
experiences of the jurors collectively. It is inherent in the nature of the
negligence decision that this is a relative decision, requiring consideration of other situations, some of which would be instances of reasonable
conduct, others of which would be considered unreasonable. The jury's
experiences would be highly relevant to this normative policy choice.
Thus, the jury's normative decision is the result of a process that
somewhat resembles that of a legislator or judge.
By contrast, unless there are trademark lawyers on the jury, the
decision about fame would be uninformed by relevant experience. In the
first place, because fame is circumscribed by a statutory definition and
because it is a statutory scheme that only applies in unusual circumstances, jurors are unlikely to have any actual experience with the linedrawing issues involved. And, because the jurors have no other outside
sources from which to glean enlightenment, their normative decision will
be a highly uninformed one.a1
There is an additional consequence of allowing jurors excessive leeway
in deciding trademark cases. In the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion

317. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2XA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
318. This does not mean it will necessarily be wrong, but it is unlikely to be the product
of a consideration of all truly relevant factors. It may also be argued that the decision
involves use of parameters that are more generalized and that those parameters are thus
issues of law. See Whitford, supra note 307, at 934-35 (noting that some contracts issues
may be generalized, while others are particular to a single case).
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in Wal-Mart,ais the Court justified imposing a higher standard for
demonstrating eligibility for protection of product designs than for other
trademark devices partly on the grounds that lawsuits can be anticompetitive weapons.a2 o If it is too easy to threaten a plausible lawsuit,
competitors will hesitate to compete in ways that may benefit consumers
but may risk lawsuits. The threat of a dilution lawsuit based on a claim
that one's mark is famous is similarly problematic. If it is difficult to
distinguish famous marks from nonfamous marks, then many trademark
owners could make a "plausible threat" of a dilution lawsuit against an
unauthorized user of the same or a similar mark.321 Because dilution
does not require confusion, this would result in many potential
defendants faced with a decision about liability and lawsuit expenses
under circumstances that would not expose them to liability for ordinary
trademark infringement. This problem, naturally, suggests that a
solution is simply a statutory clarification of the definition of a famous
mark. But apart from the political barriers to implementing such a fix,
the practical problem is that any definition will inevitably be imprecise.
That imprecision must be filled in with judicial decisions. The sum of
those decisions creates limits on the scope of the definition of famous.
Except in those instances where clear lines are drawn by appellate
courts, however, trial judges will be reluctant to include such information in jury instructions, resulting in a lack of normative guidance.32 2
That, in turn, can lead to the problems identified in Wal-Mart, at both
the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court levels.
Thus, Judge Newman's critique may be restated as a desire to tailor
the scope of jury discretion to the appropriate legal standards that
In essence, the critique recognizes that in many
govern the case."
cases, notably trademark cases, there is a normative overlay on the factfinding process, of which the jury is unaware.32 5 This represents the
underlying policy that circumscribes the substantive law. Thus, in a

319. The Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that a product design must have
secondary meaning to be protected, which was not shown in Wal-Mart. 529 U.S. at 216.
320. Id. at 213 ("Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with
regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a
rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon
alleged inherent distinctiveness.").
321. See id.
322. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions Into the Twenty-First
Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 449, 451 (2006).
323. See Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d at 135-36 (Newman, J.,
dissenting); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. at 213-14.
324. See Wal-Mart, 165 F.3d at 135-36 (Newman, J., dissenting).
325. See id.
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trade dress case, allowing juries a wide scope to determine whether a
particular trade dress is protectable would risk overprotection of what
might be functional or relatively common attributes, making competition
difficult. It would be extremely difficult to inform juries properly of the
need to account for competitive problems (although if functionality is at
issue, then some instruction would be necessary).3 2 6 As discussed
above, the lack of information available to the jury makes it difficult for
the jury to make informed decisions on these issues.
However, Judge Newman's critique does not specify how an appellate
court, or a trial court, should set the necessary boundaries, especially
within the confines of the Seventh Amendment's reexamination
clause."' The problem is particularly acute where, as in dilution
cases, there is relatively little appellate guidance available and where
the statutory definition and guiding factors are themselves somewhat
vague.
Addressing the problem requires greater attention by the trial judge
at the summary judgment or the judgment as a matter of law phases of
the litigation, or both. Weeding out cases that are not within the
intended statutory parameters would largely, though not entirely, solve
the problem of giving too much discretion to juries. But this runs into
two problems. First, there is the reluctance of trial courts to be overly
searching at that stage of the litigation, lest they be reversed and have
Second, there is a need to articulate
the case come back to them.'
the legal boundaries that are implicit in the language of the statute.

326. See, e.g., Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(stating analysis of functionality includes consideration of effect on competition of
permitting trademark owner to preclude others' use of the trademarked design).
327. See Wal-Mart, 165 F.3d at 135-36 (Newman, J., dissenting). That part of the
Seventh Amendment states that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S.
CONST. amend. VII. The wording, obviously, invites a law-fact division of labor.
328. This, too, has its problems: an appellate court will be reluctant to rely on a
judgment as a matter of law to overturn a jury verdict, as illustrated by the Second
Circuit's majority opinion in Wal-Mart, 165 F.3d at 123-24 (citing Schlaifer Nance & Co.
v. Estate of Warhol, 119 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1997)). But see Landsman, supra note 307, at
873 (arguing that appellate courts are often too willing to overturn jury verdicts). A
comprehensive empirical study of federal appellate decisions also concluded that
"[alppellate courts are indeed more favorable to defendants than are trial judges and
juries." Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate Courts:
Civil Rights Really Do Differ From Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 949
(2002). That study still found that most trial court decisions are affirmed. Id. at 952
(showing that defendants win about a third of their appeals, while plaintiffs win about
12%). Clearly, the study and Professor Landsman's analysis argue at least for caution
about common generalizations about the appellate process.
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Unfortunately, when cases are not properly confined before trial, the
nature of the jury's decision-making often switches from historical fact
finding to legal line-drawing. This is illustrated more concretely in the
next section, which examines the instructions from several recent
dilution jury trials.
C. Illustrations of the Problem: Jury Instructionson the Issue of
Fame
The best way to see the depth of the problem is to examine some
actual examples of jury instructions. In this section, we shall review
several recent jury trials as case studies of the issues discussed here.
The problems discussed above are well illustrated by a recent case
that was tried to a jury, Super Duper, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc.3 " The case
involved claims of both trademark infringement by confusion and
trademark dilution, but for the moment, we will focus on the dilution
claim. When Super Duper's application to register certain marks was
opposed by Mattel, Super Duper brought a declaratory judgment suit,
asking that its marks be declared not to violate Mattel's trademark
rights. Mattel counterclaimed, alleging, among other things, that Super
Duper's use of "SEE IT! SAY IT!" (and other marks) as a trademark was
likely to dilute the distinctiveness of Mattel's "SEE 'N SAY" and "THE
FARMER SAYS" trademarks.ase In order to win its dilution claims
Mattel had to show (1) that its trademarks were "famous"; (2) that the
marks were famous before Super Duper made a "use in commerce" of the
offending marks; and (3) that Super Duper's marks were likely to cause
either "dilution by blurring" or "dilution by tarnishment" of Mattel's
famous mark."' The terms "famous," "dilution by blurring," and
"dilution by tarnishment" are all defined in the current version of the
federal dilution statute.3

329. 382 F. App'x 308 (4th Cir. 2010) (upholding jury verdict).
330. Id. at 311-12 n.1.
331. See Lanham Act § 43(cX1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
332. Id. §§ 43(c)(2)(A) (defining a "famous mark"), (c)(2)(B) (defining "dilution by
blurring"), and (cX2XC) (defining "dilution by tarnishment"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(cX2)(A),
(c)(2)(B), (c)(2)(C). The original version of the statute did not define what a "famous" mark
was-it simply included eight factors to assist in the decision-and it did not use the terms
"dilution by blurring" or "dilution by tarnishment." See FTDA, 109 Stat. 985. There was
a single definition of "dilution" for all types of claims, although it was not particularly
satisfactory. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 421 n.1, 432-33 (2003)
(citing the original definition of dilution and noting that it did not clearly encompass
tarnishment as a form of dilution).
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Let us consider the instructions to the jury in Super Duper on the
issue of a famous mark:333
FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION - IN GENERAL33"
IF THE OWNER OF A FAMOUS TRADEMARK ESTABLISHES THAT
ANOTHER PARTY BEGAN USING A TRADEMARK, WHICH IS
LIKELY TO CAUSE DILUTION OF THE FAMOUS TRADEMARK
AFTER THE OWNER'S TRADEMARK BECAME FAMOUS, IT CAN
ENJOIN THE USE OF THAT TRADEMARK, REGARDLESS OF THE
PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF ACTUAL OR LIKELY CONFUSION,
THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF COMPETITION, OR THE
PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF ACTUAL ECONOMIC INJURY. THIS
IS KNOWN AS AN INJUNCTION. DILUTION IS THE LESSENING
OF THE CAPACITY OF A FAMOUS TRADEMARK TO IDENTIFY
DISTINCTIVENESS REFERS
AND DISTINGUISH PRODUCTS.3
TO THE ABILITY OF THE FAMOUS TRADEMARK TO UNIQUELY
IDENTIFY A SINGLE SOURCE AND THUS MAINTAIN ITS
SELLING POWER. A TRADEMARK IS FAMOUS WHEN IT IS
WIDELY RECOGNIZED BY THE GENERAL CONSUMING PUBLIC
OF THE UNITED STATES AS A DESIGNATION OF SOURCE OF
THE PRODUCTS OF THE TRADEMARK'S OWNER. TO PREVAIL
ON ITS DILUTION CLAIM UNDER FEDERAL LAW, MATTEL MUST
PROVE THE FOLLOWING THINGS BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE:
1. MATTEL OWNS ONE OR MORE FAMOUS TRADEMARKS THAT
IS DISTINCTIVE;
2. SUPER DUPER IS MAKING COMMERCIAL USE OF ONE OR
MORE OR ITS TRADEMARKS;
3. SUPER DUPER'S USE OF ITS TRADEMARKS CAME AFTER AT
LEAST ONE OF MATTEL'S TRADEMARKS BECAME FAMOUS;
AND

333. The entire set of jury instructions can be found on Westlaw. Jury Instructions,
Super Duper, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 605CV01700, 2008 WL 4328935 (D.S.C. Apr. 25,
2008). The instructions only refer to one of Mattel's marks, SEE 'N SAY. See id.
However, the court of appeals clearly believed that the jury found another Mattel mark,
THE FARMER SAYS, to be famous as well. Super Duper, 382 F. App'x at 312 n.1.
334. Jury Instructions, Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935. Obviously, this first
instruction deals with more than just fame. However, it is the only place in the
instructions where the basic definition of a famous mark can be found.
335. The court's definition of dilution is not the one in the TDRA; it is from the original
FTDA. Compare FTDA, 109 Stat. 985, with Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
However, the "likelihood of dilution" standard is from the TDRA, not the FTDA, and the
definition of famous is also from the TDRA. See Lanham Act §§ 43(cX2)(B), (C), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1125(c)(2)(B), (C).
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4. SUPER DUPER'S USE OF ITS TRADEMARKS IS LIKELY TO
CAUSE DILUTION BY LESSENING THE CAPACITY OF MATTEL'S
TRADEMARKS TO IDENTIFY AND DISTINGUISH ITS GOODS.

FACTORS FOR FAMOUS TRADEMARKS
IN DETERMINING WHETHER MATTEL'S TRADEMARKS POSSESS
THE REQUISITE DEGREE OF RECOGNITION THAT MAY
SUBJECT THEM TO DILUTION, YOU MAY CONSIDER ALL
RELEVANT FACTORS, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:
1. THE DURATION, EXTENT, AND GEOGRAPHIC REACH OF
ADVERTISING AND PUBLICITY OF THESE TRADEMARKS,
WHETHER ADVERTISED OR PUBLICIZED BY THE OWNER OR
THIRD PARTIES.
2. THE AMOUNT, VOLUME, AND GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT OF
SALES OF GOODS OR SERVICES OFFERED UNDER THE SEE ['N]
SAY TRADEMARKS.
3. THE EXTENT OF ACTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE MARK.
4. WHETHER THE SEE 'N SAY TRADEMARKS WERE REGIS-

TERED UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1881, OR THE ACT OF
FEBRUARY 20,1905, OR ON THE PRINCIPAL REGISTER. HERE,
THE PARTIES AGREE THAT MATTEL'S SEE 'N SAY TRADEMARKS WERE REGISTERED ON THE PRINCIPAL REGISTER OF
THE CURRENT U.S. TRADEMARK ACT. THEREFORE, YOU MAY
3
FIND THAT THE [FOURTH]m

FAVORS MATTEL.3

FACTOR IN PROVING FAME

These instructions contain several critical deficiencies. First of all, the
actual statutory definition of a famous mark is buried in the middle of
the first instruction, which is denominated a "general" instruction on
dilution."' Therefore, the jury likely will not focus on the actual
definition. In addition, the definition is presented with no additional
explanation, so the nuances and policies-namely, the normative aspects
of the definition-are lost entirely. The second instruction, labeled
"Factors for Famous Trademarks,"" which focused on the issue of a
famous mark, was clearly deficient as well. It consisted entirely of a
recitation of the factors listed in the statute which are intended to guide
the decision, but did not reiterate the definition, nor did it even refer

336. The trial judge made a handwritten correction here to the instructions that is not
reflected on Westlaw. A copy of the original jury instructions is on file with the author.
337. Jury Instructions, Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935.
338. See id.
339. Id.

2012]

WHO SHOULD DECIDE?

487

4 o It seems likely
back to the definition in the previous instruction.a
that the jury, when deciding the issue of fame, would focus on this
second instruction because of its label. But by including only the factors,
this instruction ignores the fact that the factors are at best indirect
evidence of a famous mark and that it is the definition that must govern.
Thus, the court's instructions were likely to mislead the jury into
focusing on the factors to the exclusion of the definition. Furthermore,
this instruction highlighted the factor of registration as favoring fame,
when that factor actually should be accorded minor weight in the
decision.' The appropriate weight to be accorded this factor is another
normative aspect of the definition of a famous mark which could be
found in judicial opinions but was omitted from the instruction.
The instruction thus illustrates the problems just discussed. First,
there is a lack of factual guidance from other situations. Second, there
is the normative information gap-a judge could look up other opinions
and sources of the law, but a jury cannot. Third, because the instructions do not fill in the details, the jury will have to do so, creating the
problem of the jury effectively setting the legal standard. There was a
general normative gap on the issue of fame, one that may not easily be
correctable. The instructions did nothing to indicate to the jury the
rigorous analysis that courts are expected to undertake in this area, nor
that the statute intended a very limited universe of famous marks.342
The concept of a rigorous analysis provides an important implicit
normative limit on the determination of fame. Judges understand this
limitation because of the information available to them from other
opinions. How one introduces such an implicit limit into jury instructions is not clear.
The problem of lack of jury guidance is compounded by the nature of
appellate review of jury decisions. In Super Duper, the jury decided in
favor of Mattel on this issue-namely, it decided that Mattel's trademarks
were famous-and it decided in favor of Mattel on the issue of diluThe judgment on the verdict was appealed to the United
tion."
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed in an

340. See id. This may be a remnant of the previous version of the statute, which did
not include a definition, but only listed eight factors to be used as guidance in making the
decision. See FTDA § 3(c), 109 Stat. at 985-86.
341. This problem was compounded by the court's earlier instructions on the relevance
of registration to the "strength" of a mark for infringement by confusion purposes. See
infra text accompanying notes 400-10.
342. Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that fame is a
"rigorous standard"); Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 907-08 (9th Cir.
2002).
343. Super Duper, 382 F. App'x at 312.
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unpublished, per curiam opinion. 44 In that opinion, the court stated
that "the jury was well situated to make the factual determination that
Mattel's marks were 'famous,'. . . and we are prohibited from reweighing
the evidence or drawing inferences from the facts."04 ' Nothing more
was said about the issue of fame. The court treated the issue as if it
were a simple matter of historical fact, instead of a nuanced combination
of law and fact. It said nothing about the proper parameters for the
jury's deliberations. Further evidence of the deference accorded to jury
verdicts is contained in the court's discussion of the jury's verdict on
other issues of both dilution and confusion?" Although the court
found error in various individual instructions, it held that "as a whole"
the instructions correctly stated the law."' This, of course, is not
unique to trademark law. Courts use this standard in civil cases
At least one of the errors was rather serious-the court
generally.'
allowed the jury to consider awarding damages for dilution when the
statute would not allow it."' But the court did not reverse. 5 e

344. Id.
345. Id. at 314 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
346. Id. at 315-16.
347. Id. at 314; see also id. at 314-16 (discussing Super Duper's objections to jury
instructions and the fact that the judge erroneously allowed the jury to award dilution
damages when the statute would not have allowed them).
348. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wis. Energy Corp., 642 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011)
(considering "jury instructions as a whole" in a breach of contract case). In Super Duper,
the Fourth Circuit used the same standard to judge the jury's findings related to
infringement by confusion. Super Duper, 382 F. App'x at 314-15. In particular, in response
to a challenge to a jury instruction relating to a lack of evidence of actual confusion, the
court called it a "factual matter best left to the jury's determination." Id. at 315. The trial
court had instructed the jury that this was a neutral fact that "does not favor either party."
Id. But earlier in its opinion, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a fact finder may use
a lack of evidence of actual confusion as "a strong inference" of lack of confusion. Id. at 313
(quoting CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Yet the jury instructions gave no hint of that
possibility, and seemed to steer the jury away from such a finding. Deference to the jury's
weighing of the evidence would be more appropriate if the jury had been properly informed
of the legal parameters that govern the process.
349. See Jury Instructions, Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935.
350. Super Duper, 382 F. App'x at 317-18. In George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968
F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit appears to have upheld a jury verdict on a
special verdict even without a finding on a crucial issue. The court held that a reasonable
jury could have determined that the particular trade dress at issue had secondary meaning-being recognized by the public as a trademark-and therefore its verdict was valid. Id.
at 1536-37. However, there was no indication that the jury had actually made a finding
on that issue, even though the case was submitted under a special verdict. See id. at 153536.
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The wide berth given the jury's finding by the court of appeals in
Super Duper meant that there was virtually no oversight of the jury's
decision, one that held SEE 'N SAY to be a mark "widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States."35 1 Parents of
young children may generally recognize this as a trademark, but one
might be forgiven some skepticism about other groups of consumers. In
other words, these marks may have niche fame, but the intent of the
2006 amendments to the federal dilution statute was to eliminate such
marks from eligibility for dilution protection.5
Unfortunately, that bit of information was never transmitted to the
jury. Furthermore, the trial court's instructions highlight what should
be a minor factor in the decision, namely federal registration, without
It would not be surprisany explanation of its relative importance."
ing if a jury interpreted the judge's instructions in a manner that greatly
overvalued the federal registration. If the court of appeals had reviewed
the jury's verdict with a close eye on the legal limits of what can be
called a famous mark, perhaps it would have reversed, but its unwillingness to question the jury's verdict was clear.
One might argue that the Fourth Circuit's review of the jury's verdict
was not materially different from the review that would have been given
a judge's decision. After all, under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court of appeals is supposed to uphold the trial court's
findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous."as' But that would
be too simplistic. In the first place, a bench trial would have required
the judge to issue both findings of fact and conclusions of law.15 5 That
would have made review of a bench trial an easier task. Thus, for
example, a judge would be likely to comment on the issue of niche fame,
which would be a legal matter for appellate review. Similarly, the
relative weight given to federal registration probably would have been
made clear, again facilitating the appropriate review.
Second, as I have been arguing, the issue of whether a mark is famous
may not be a true factual issue. An opinion that sets forth both findings
of fact and conclusions of law may make that point more clearly to an
appellate court. In the infringement context, the Second Circuit has
held that the determination of the weight of individual factors in a

351. See Super Duper, 382 F. App'x at 314; Lanham Act

§ 1125(c)(2)(A).
352.
353.
354.
355.
factual

§ 43(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.

H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 8.
See Jury Instructions Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(aX6).
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). A special verdict would contain additional detail as to
findings, but would not include conclusions of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
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likelihood of confusion analysis is an issue of fact, while the overall
decision about likelihood of confusion is an issue of law.356 The
analysis of fame is not that different from the analysis of confusion in
terms of the intertwining of fact and law. If anything, the legal
underpinnings of the term famous are more pronounced than the legal
aspects of confusion. Thus, a court of appeals could justify a different
kind of review, one that looks for proper and complete legal standards,
especially of a judge trial. The existence of findings of fact and
conclusions of law would make this task an easier one, as the appeals
court could determine whether the trial judge was applying the proper
legal, normative standards by reviewing the trial judge's findings. Thus,
for example, although the fact of registration may not be reviewable
(except minimally), the weight to be accorded that fact could be
considered a legal issue subject to de novo review.
The problem ofjury instructions and the understanding ofjuries is one
to which we will return shortly. But as our review of the Super Duper
instructions and the Fourth Circuit's refusal to exercise serious oversight
shows, somewhere in the decision-making process there needs to be an
injection of normative standards that will govern the decisions,
otherwise the jury will effectively be setting the legal rules of behavior
in this area.
Thus far, we have only examined a single set of jury instructions. The
Super Duper problem, however, is not unique. Other cases tried to juries
in the past few years exhibit similar deficiencies. I have gathered the
relevant instructions from four other jury trials: adidas-America,Inc. v.
Payless Shoesource, Inc.;as7 University of Kansas v. Sinks;5 " Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch 7-ading Co.;"9 and SLB Toys
USA, Inc. v. Wham-O, Inc.360 The jury instructions from each on the
dilution claims are reproduced in Appendices A-D. I cannot claim that
these are necessarily representative of dilution instructions generally.

356. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1510 (2d Cir. 1997).
357. No. CV 01 1655 KI, 2008 WL 4279812 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2008); Jury Instructions,
adidas-America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., No. 01-1655-KI (D. Or. May 1, 2008) (on
file with the Author) (reproduced in part in Appendix C).
358. 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2008); Jury Instructions, Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, No.
06-2341-JAR (D. Kan. July 9, 2008) (on file with the Author) (reproduced in part in
Appendix B).
359. No. C 07-03752 JSW, 2009 WL 1082175 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009); Jury
Instructions, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., No. 307CV03752,
2008 WL 5721750 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008) (reproduced in Appendix A).
360. 330 F. App'x 634 (9th Cir. 2009); Trial Transcript, SLB Toys USA, Inc. v. Wham0, Inc., No. CV 06-1382-RSWL (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with the Author)
(reproduced in Appendix D).
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However, the similarities among them, and the fact that all of the cases
are from different districts, may be indicative of a pattern. All but one
of the cases, including Super Duper, share one other attribute that I
believe is no coincidence-all but one of the juries found in favor of the
dilution plaintiff both on the issue of fame and the issue of likelihood of
dilution (in one case, awarding an extraordinarily large monetary
verdict).:6
Consider first the most recent of the cases: Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., a case involving both infringement
and dilution.36 2 Of the five cases discussed here, this one provided the
most detailed set of instructions on the issue of a famous mark." The
Levi Strauss court gave two instructions on the issue of fame." The
first largely recited the definition contained in the Lanham Act, but with
two additional admonitions:
In determining whether Levi Strauss's Arcuate trademark is famous,
you may consider several factors I will describe for you in a moment.
These factors are only suggestions and may not constitute all of the
possible types of evidence indicating whether a mark is famous. The
presence or absence of any one particular factor on this list should not

361. The jury in adidas-America,Inc. awarded over $300 million, including over $137
million in punitive damages, on all claims, including both infringement and dilution. 2008
WL 4279812, at *1. This was later reduced by the trial court to a total of approximately
$65 million, including $15 million punitive damages. Id. at *11. The original award
included over $30 million for a reasonable royalty and $137 million of the defendant's
profits. Id. at *1. The profits award was reduced to $19.7 million. Id. at *16. The jury
in Super Duper awarded damages (on all claims) of $400,000, which was increasedby the
trial court to $993,113. 382 F. App'x at 312. In Sinks, the jury awarded $119,087 of the
defendant's profits (it is not clear whether other awards were made), and the trial judge
upheld that award. 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1308. The jury in SLB Toys found in favor of
Wham-O and awarded damages, though the amount is unclear. 330 F. App'x at 636-37.
The exception was the jury in the Levi Strauss case, which did not find a likelihood of
dilution. See 2009 WL 1082175, at *9.
362. See Jury Instructions, Levi Strauss, 2008 WL 5721750 (reproduced in Appendix
A). Because plaintiff dropped its damage claims before trial, the jury verdict was
technically advisory. See Levi Strauss,2009 WL 1082175, at *1. Interestingly, because the
trial court found no likelihood of dilution, the trial court specifically declined to make any
finding concerning the fame of the mark based on the jury's verdict. Id. at *9 n.6.
Following denial of the plaintiffs motion for judgment as a matter of law, No. C 07-03752
JSW, 2009 WL 1561432, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2009) (denying the motion based on
whether dilution requires marks to be "identical or nearly identical"), the case was
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, but not on the issue of fame.
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir.
2011) (reversing on issue of "identical or nearly identical").
363. See Jury Instructions, Levi Strauss, 2008 WL 5721750.
364. Id.
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necessarily determine whether a trademark is famous. You should
consider all the relevant evidence in making your determination."
This instruction has the virtue of admonishing the jury not to simply
add up factors. However, it would have been preferable for it to have
reiterated the primacy of the definition. Moreover, it gave no indication
of the relative importance of any of the four factors."' As discussed
earlier, at least one of the factors, whether the mark is federally
registered, should be given little weight because it says almost nothing
about the mark's actual recognition by the "general consuming public.""' Yet a jury would have no way of knowing this without proper
guidance. This problem is magnified in a case such as this, where the
jury also was instructed on a trademark infringement claim.36 8 In that
portion of the instructions, the jury was specifically told that the
existence of federal registrations for the mark meant that "you must find
that Levi Strauss owns the Arcuate trademark as depicted in those
registrations and that the Arcuate trademark as depicted in those
registrations is valid and protectable."36 Nothing in the instructions
about dilution cautioned the jury that the effect of federal registration
in the area of fame was vastly different than what it had been told in
connection with infringement. The opportunity for misunderstanding
the importance of registration in the fame analysis is obvious.a7 e
The second instruction on the issue of fame was partly a matter of
proper timing (the mark must be famous before defendant began using
it), but it contained some additional guidance:
To be "famous," Levi Strauss's Arcuate trademark must have been
truly prominent and renowned at the time of Abercrombie's first
commercial use of the Ruehl design. Levi Strauss's Arcuate trademark
must have become very widely recognized by the consuming public as
the designator of Levi Strauss's goods and must have such significant
consumer associations that even uses of marks on non-competing goods
can affect the Arcuate trademark's value."

365. Id. (instruction labeled "TRADEMARK DILUTION-FAME OF PLAINTIFF'S

MARK").
366. See Lanham Act § 43(cX2XAXi)-(iv), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2XA)(i)-(iv).
367. Id. § 43(cX2)(A)(iv), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2XA)(iv).
368. Jury Instructions, Levi Strauss, 2008 WL 5721750.
369. Id. (emphasis added) (instruction labeled "INFRINGEMENT-ELEMENTS
PRESUMED VALIDITY AND OWNERSHIP-REGISTERED TRADEMARK").
370. Essentially the same instruction was given in the Super Duper case regarding the
effect of registration and validity in connection with the trademark infringement by
confusion claim in that case. See Jury Instructions, Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935.
371. Jury Instructions, Levi Strauss, 2008 WL 5721750.
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Unlike the instructions in Super Duper, this one gives the jury some
understanding that the bar for famous marks may be significantly
higher than for merely strong marks. 72 Unfortunately, "truly prominent and renowned" 73 probably does not add enough to the jury's
understanding; it would have been better if the court had given
examples and/or some additional normative guidance. An instruction
that the analysis is a "rigorous" one, 7 perhaps even adding that
doubts should be resolved against fame,17 1 would have made the point
more clearly. The last part of the instruction, concerning noncompeting
marks, is only helpful if one can imagine what other marks might satisfy
such criteria.37' To a limited degree, the second instruction comes
back to the underlying definition of a famous mark.377 However, it
does not explicitly tie the factors back to the definition. Although it has
the outlines of some normative limits, including the idea of "very widely
recognized" and instructing the jury to consider noncompeting uses as
relevant to fame, those boundaries are poorly defined and may well be
lost in the mass of instructions.'
As in Super Duper, there was no
explicit instruction on the issue of niche market fame, which is an
important boundary for the jury to understand, nor was there any
attempt to provide boundaries for the concept of "widely recognized."W7
A third case, University of Kansas v. Sinks," used an instruction
that seemed to blend pre-TDRA dilution law with a small amount of the
TDRA-namely, the factors for fame (advertising, sales, recognition, and

372.

See id.

373. Id.
374. See Green, 486 F.3d at 105 (describing fame as "a rigorous standard, as it extends
protection only to highly distinctive marks that are well-known throughout the country").
375. See KST Elec., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
376. Jury Instructions, Levi Strauss,2008 WL 5721750. That portion of the instruction
appears to be based on the opinion of the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board in Toro Co. v.
ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1164, 1181 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
377. Jury Instructions, Levi Strauss, 2008 WL 5721750; see Lanham Act § 43(cX2XA),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2)(A). However, the instruction refers to "the consuming public," not
"the general consuming public." Jury Instructions, Levi Strauss, 2008 WL 5721750. The

omission of the word "general" is not a trivial one. That word encapsulates the distinction
between niche fame and fame as intended by the TDRA. The "consuming public" might
be understood as only including those who are the intended buyers of the trademarked
goods. The "general consuming public" implies a wider group of people, even those who
would not even think of buying the trademarked goods.
378. See Jury Instructions, Levi Strauss, 2008 WL 5721750.
379. See Jury Instructions, Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935; Jury Instructions, Levi

Strauss, 2008 WL 5721750.
380. 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2008).
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registration)."' The instruction lacked the definition currently in the
statute, yet listed the four factors from the TDRA."' But there was
an additional complication in this case. Kansas, where the suit was
brought, has a dilution statute modeled after the original FTDA.
The court separately instructed the jury on the requirements of Kansas
law, which also requires a "famous" mark, but only requires the mark to
be one famous in the state of Kansas to satisfy the state statute.3 *
The court's instruction on "fame" under state law included the eight
factors listed in state law, which are largely the same as the eight
factors originally in the federal statute.3 " However, most are not the
same as the four factors currently included in the federal law. There was
no instruction that would assist the jury in separating the issue of fame
under Kansas law and the factors used to decide fame, from the issue of
fame under federal law. 38 6 The state law factors themselves do not
circumscribe the inquiry. Even the TDRA definition gives some
boundaries, though they are not particularly clear.3 " The jury instructions in Sinks combine a lack of normative guidance with a lack of
understanding so that jurors may be confused when faced with the task
of determining fame and dilution under two different laws with two
different standards.
A fourth case to consider is adidas-America,Inc. v. Payless Shoesource,
Inc.388 This case involved the "three stripes" marking that adidas puts

381. See Jury Instructions, instruction 49, Sinks, No. 06-2341-JAR (on file with the
Author). The case involved activity that began before the TDRA. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d
at 1294. Because damages were requested, the pre-TDRA standard of actual dilution
applied. See adidasAm., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1061-62 (D. Or. 2008) (citations omitted).
Prior to the TDRA, the statute contained no definition of a famous mark. See FTDA, 109
Stat. 985.
382. See Jury Instructions, instruction 49, Sinks, No. 06-2341-JAR (on file with the
Author).
383. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-214(a) (Supp. 2004).
384. Jury Instructions, instruction 51, Sinks, No. 06-2341-JAR (on file with the Author).
385. See id.
386. See id., instructions 50-51. The issue of geographic limits could be critical here.
A Kansas jury may be familiar with the logo and colors of the University of Kansas, which
were the primary trademarks at issue in the case. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1294-95.
Thus, the University of Kansas colors may be famous in Kansas. But whether a broader
segment of the United States population would be aware of those marks is far more
questionable. See KST Elec., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 679 (University of Texas "longhorn" logo
not famous because widely known only to sports fans); Champagne Louis Roderer v. J.
Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836,880 (D. Minn. 2010) (CRISTAL champagne only
a niche mark in 1993, when defendant's use began).
387. See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
388. adidas-America, No. CV 01 1655 KI, 2008 WL 4279812 (D. Ore. Sept. 12, 2008).

WHO SHOULD DECIDE?

2012]

495

on its footwear, which adidas claims as a trademark."' Like Sinks,
this case included infringement, federal dilution, and state dilution
claims (along with state claims for unfair competition). Also like Sinks,
because of the time period involved, the case was tried under the old
federal standard, not the current one, even though the case was tried
The jury instructions on dilution
after the TDRA was enacted.a"'
similarly reflect an interesting blending of pre-TDRA law and postTDRA law. On the issue of fame, the court essentially stuck to preTDRA law, in contrast to Sinks."' The court recited the eight factors
listed in the original FTDA with no embellishment or added guidance
(the original FTDA did not define the term famous).392 This is in
contrast to some of the instructions concerning infringement (by
confusion), where the court gave the jury additional guidance on the
In adidasapplicable factors, apparently drawn from case law."
from the
comes
law
federal
and
former
of
current
blend
the
America,
where
fame,
than
rather
dilution,
demonstrating
on
court's instruction
it lists the factors included in the TDRA's definition of dilution by
blurring as relevant to that decision under pre-TDRA law (there were no
factors in the original statute and the definition was not the same as
that contained in the TDRA).3 94

389.

See id. at *1.

390. See generally id; see also adidas-America v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 546 F. Supp.
2d 1029, 1043 (D. Ore. 2008) (order granting summary judgment, in part).
391. See Jury Instructions, instructions 31-34, adidas-America,No. 01-1655-KI (on file
with the Author). There is an oddity in the instructions that could conceivably have
confused the jury. Although the court did instruct the jury that federal law required a
famous mark, see id., instructions 32-34, in an instruction just prior to these, the court
stated that "dilution is the lessening of the capacity of a famous or well-known or
distinctive mark or tradedress to identify and distinguish goods or services as coming from
a single source." Id., instruction 31 (emphasis added). The use of "or" is incorrect as a
matter of federal law; as the later instructions indicate, federal law requires a mark to be
famous and distinctive. The term "well-known" is not relevant to dilution law, and as a
term of art in trademark law, it has a very different meaning than "famous." See Lanham
Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
392. See Jury Instructions, instruction 34, adidas-America,No. 01-655-KI (on file with
the Author).
393. See, e.g., id., instruction 26 (Likelihood of Confusion) (not included in the
appendix).
394. See id., instruction 36. This is a bit odd, since the TDRA made the standard
easier to prove-it changed the actual dilution standard promulgated by the Supreme Court
in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) to likelihood of dilution-and

thus one could question whether it was appropriate to use the TDRA's factors. They are
not necessarily irrelevant to the decision, so the court's instruction may be perfectly fine,
but it is somewhat strange.

496

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Even more than the other cases, the instructions in adidas-America
lack normative guidance on an essential prerequisite to recovery-namely, whether the plaintiff's marks were famous. And the
wording of the pre-TDRA law creates an additional problem (which
would also apply to the Sinks claim under state law). It lists eight
factors as relevant to the determination of whether a mark is "distinctive
and famous," without separating factors relevant to each determinaDistinctiveness in trademark law has a meaning that is
tion.3 9'
different from fame-distinctiveness-refers to the baseline ability of a
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services of its owner; fame is
a heightened standard that requires showing widespread actual recognition, something not required by distinctiveness. All trademark claims,
confusion and dilution, require that a mark be distinctive, but only
Without any underdilution requires that a mark be famous."
standing of the fact that the level of recognition for a famous mark is
significantly greater than that for a distinctive mark, it is unclear how
and whether a jury would readily separate the two inquiries. Because
the jury also was instructed on the issue of distinctiveness and on its
significance as a prerequisite to recovery on an infringement claim, there
is a serious danger that the jury would not understand that distinctiveness is a much different and lower standard than fame. 9
Similarly, in SLB Toys USA, Inc. v. Wham-O, Inc.,"" the court
simply recited the eight factors used in the pre-TDRA statute to
determine fame without any further guidance. 99
It is interesting to compare the instructions for dilution to the
instructions for infringement, especially when it comes to the factor
analyses relevant to each claim. For the dilution claims and, in
particular, on the issue of fame, the courts do little more than recite the
factors; there is no additional guidance as to the meaning and relevance
of each factor. The infringement claims are treated rather differently.
Jurors are instructed about the factors of confusion, which are entirely
judge made (and which, it should be noted, vary a bit from circuit to
circuit), and they are instructed about the difference between "strong"
and "weak" marks, again, based on case law, not statutory language.40 0

395. See FTDA, 109 Stat. at 985-86.
396. See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
397. See Jury Instructions, adidas-America, No. 01-1655-KI.
398. 330 F. App'x 634 (9th Cir. 2009).
399. Trial Transcript, SLB Toys USA, Inc., No. CV 06-1382-RSWL (on file with the
Author) (reproduced in part in Appendix D). The instructions here are not as complete as
the others, but the effect is basically the same.
400. Strong marks are given greater protection from potential confusion than weak
marks. Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 865.
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For example, in the Super Duper case, the jury was given several
instructions on the issue of likelihood of confusion.4 0 1 In one infringement instruction, the court listed the factors used in the Fourth Circuit
to analyze likelihood of confusion.40 2 As with the dilution instructions
on the issue of fame, the court notes that no one factor is dispositive and
that not all will be present in any given case.403 Interestingly, the
court adds that "Any doubt regarding the outcome of the likelihood of
confusion analysis must be resolved in favor of Mattel."40 No such
instruction was given regarding dilution in general, or fame in particular.405
One of the factors in the confusion analysis is "The Strength or
In contrast with the
Distinctiveness of Mattel's Trademarks."406
guidance about
the
jury
additional
the
court
gave
dilution instructions,
instructions on
were
four
separate
There
the meaning of "strength."'
4 08
The
subparts.
multiple
of
which
contained
this issue alone, two
strength"
from
"commercial
court distinguished "conceptual
strength,"' and instructed on the role of third-party use in this
area.410 For each of the other confusion factors, the court gave an
additional instruction to assist the jury.41 1 No doubt these instructions
reflect the fact that there is considerable case law discussing confusion,
while there is a relative paucity of case law discussing dilution in detail.

401. See Jury instructions, Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935.
402. Id. (instruction labeled "Infringement-Elements-Likelihood of Confusion-Factors
(15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a))"). The Lanham Act does not contain any factors to guide
the analysis of confusion. Each circuit has developed a slightly different set of factors to
guide courts, although many of the important factors are similar across the circuits. See
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW

AND POLICY 506-08 (3d ed. 2010) (including chart showing each circuit's factors).
403. Jury Instructions, Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935 (instruction labeled "Infringement-Elements-Likelihood of Confusion-Factors (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a))").
404. Id. The court of appeals held that this instruction was erroneous, but that the
instructions, taken "as a whole," were appropriate. Super Duper, 382 F. App'x at 314.
405. See Jury Instructions, Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935.
406. Id. (instruction labeled "Infringement-Elements-Likelihood of Confusion-Factors
(15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) and 1125(a))").
407.
408.

See id.
See id.

409. See id. Conceptual strength refers to the mark's inherent uniqueness-the mark
"xycc" would be conceptually stronger than the mark "flavorful." Commercial strength
refers to the actual recognition of the mark by consumers as a mark-that is, as a source
identifier, not a descriptive term or a decoration or other nonsource identifying matter. See
id.

410. See id. That is, use by people other than the trademark owner to refer to the
trademarked goods, showing wider recognition of the mark. See id.
411.

See id.
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Certainly the judge perceived himself to be on more solid ground giving
additional instructions in the area of confusion.
Unfortunately, the additional clarification of confusion may have
impeded the jury's understanding of the dilution instructions. The
factors of strength and similarity are also present in dilution (the latter
in the analysis of dilution itself, rather than fame), but their role in
dilution is not the same as their role in confusion. With no added
clarification in the dilution instructions, the jury most likely would
assume that the clarifications with respect to these issues in the
confusion instructions applied equally to the dilution claim. There was
nothing in the dilution instructions to disabuse the jury of this notion.
Thus, the lack of guidance in the dilution instructions is doubly
problematic. Not only does it leave the jury in the dark about the
normative goals and structure of the dilution claim,4 12 it may actually
lead them astray, by implying that dilution can be analyzed using the
same conceptual tools as confusion.
D. Who Should Decide? Parsingthe Factualfrom the Legal
The lack of guidance in these instructions produces the very problem
discussed earlier. Jurors are effectively left to create legal standards,
and their decisions are likely to be less predictable and less reflective of
the standards intended by the statute than are judicial decisions.
Moreover, jury decisions are subject to fairly deferential review, making
correction of the jury's implicit, and incorrect, legal standards unlikely.
One obvious solution is to include more legal guidelines in the
instructions. There are institutional impediments to this solution, most
notably the reluctance of trial judges to give instructions that are not
directly tied to either statutory language or language contained in a
relevant circuit court opinion.413 But even if we can overcome that
barrier, it is instructive to review some of the research that has been
conducted into methods of improvingjuror comprehension of instructions
in order to see whether this solution would be effective.

412. It is worth noting here that the court gave a general instruction entitled
"Trademark Liability-Theories and Policies (15 U.S.C. §1114(L), 11125(a))." Id. Given the
label, this presumably was not intended to apply to dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
However, the absence of such an instruction in the dilution area may have led the jury to
use this instruction as a general guide to trademark law, since the jurors may not have
recognized the distinction between §1125(a), the confusion provision, and §1125(c), the
dilution section. Curiously, the instruction virtually invited the jury to make policy
judgments of a kind normally left to judges and legislatures. See id. The Ninth Circuit
pattern jury instructions for trademark cases contain the same instruction. MODEL CIV.
JURY INSTR. § 15.4 (9th Cir. 2007).
413. See Marder, supra note 322, at 451, 459, 473-74, 495.
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At least from the perspective of logic and judicial belief, the functioning of the jury system would be enhanced by giving jurors proper
guidance so as to improve their comprehension of their function and of
the applicable law. 414 Obviously, there is an underlying assumption
that underadvised jurors will be less capable than judges in deciding
cases. 415 However, there is another aspect of the problem that is
underappreciated in cases like trademark dilution. As seen in the
instructions discussed in the previous subsection, the statutory language
is fraught with uncertainty. Much of that uncertainty is not filled in
with normative instruction by the judge. Consequently, juries must
engage in a certain amount of statutory interpretation. Unfortunately,
this is an issue that has not been well-studied empirically,4 1 so it is
difficult to make definitive statements about its effect on decisionmaking."'
Studies have been conducted to determine whether and how juror
comprehension of the law can be improved.4" Some reform proposals
are procedural-that is, they focus on the timing of giving instructions
(before trial, before summation, after summation), giving jurors copies
of the instructions, and the like.4" For our purposes, however, the

414.

See, e.g., Judge B. Michael Dann, Jurorsand the Futureof "Tort Reform," 78 CHi.-

KENT L. REv. 1127, 1130 (2003) ("jurors will benefit from any tort reform proposal that
will, by its terms or consequences, enhance jury comprehension"); J. Brittany Cross, Juror
Incomprehension:Advocating for a Holistic Reform of Jury Instructions, 98 KY. L.J. 355,

355-56 (2009-10) ("Juror incomprehension of the law in jury instructions is a widespread
problem in American courts.").
415. One author reviewed patent cases and found marked differences in the outcomes
of jury trials compared with judge trials. Amy Tindell, Toward a More Reliable FactFinder in Patent Litigation, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 309, 320-23 (2009); see also
Frederick Schauer, Is There a Psychology of Judging? 3-4 (Harvard University Faculty

Research Working Papers, Paper No. RWPO7-049, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/ab
stract=1015143 (questioning whether judicial decision-making would be similar to decisionmaking by juries); Stempel, supra note 252.
416. See Darryl K. Brown, PlainMeaning, PracticalReason, and Culpability: Toward
a Theory of Jury Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1201-03

(1998).
417. Because there are relatively few jury trials in dilution cases, the effect may be
small. But given the large jury verdict in the adidas-America case, its effect on the
behavior of other companies cannot be ignored. See adidas-America,2008 WL 427812 at
*1.
418. E.g., Wissler, et al., supra note 259; Shari Seidman Diamond, Michael J. Saks &
Stephan Landsman, JurorJudgmentsAbout Liability and Damages:Sourcesof Variability
and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1998).
419. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth &Alan Reifman, JurorComprehensionand Public Policy,

6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 788, 814-15 (2000).
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most salient materials are proposals that address the substance of the
jury instructions.420
Damages traditionally have been the province of a jury. Some
researchers have studied jury understanding of instructions by focusing
on damage instructions and the proper application of normative limits
on damages. One study examined the effect of variations in jury
instructions on general damage awards. 42 1 The authors suggest that
failing to instruct jurors ("blindfolding" them) on issues such as
attorneys fees and insurance, about which jurors have prior knowledge
will not keep them from wrongly consulting their own knowledge of
these matters.4 22 This can be analogized to the issue of fame, where
jurors almost certainly will have preconceived (and legally erroneous)
notions of what a famous mark would be. Jury misunderstanding of the
law is also evident in the handling of damages where there is comparative negligence. In theory, the jury should decide the total amount of
damage suffered by plaintiff and, separately, the percentage of plaintiff's
fault. The award is then calculated by reducing damages by the
percentage of fault. But studies indicate that jurors do not separate the
two, possibly resulting in a double reduction of the damages-once by
jurors and again by the fault percentage.4 2 3 This further indicates that
jurors will make erroneous normative choices when the instructions
leave gaps in the legal regime to be filled in by jurors. 424 A separate
study indicated that jurors given examples of damage awards from other
cases showed less variability in their awards; also, suggestions made by
the parties are shown to affect awards.4 " Again, this suggests that

420. This is not to say that procedural reforms cannot address the problem. For a
discussion of proposals to give jurors more empirical data see Dann, supra note 414, at
1134-35.
421. Wissler, et al., supra note 259. This article noted that an earlier study indicated
that giving jurors guidelines based on awards in other cases (upper and lower bounds, and
examples from other cases) tended to reduce the variance in the size of awards. Id. at 719.
This relates to the information gap discussed earlier, suggesting that giving jurors access
to some of the judge's database would affect jury behavior.
422. Id. at 721-23. Jurors are not supposed to consider insurance or attorneys fees in
making awards. However, most of them know that attorneys fees are taken out of the
award and that many people have insurance. Id. at 721-22.
423. Id. at 728-30 (collecting and discussing studies).
424. The study conducted by the article's authors indicated that clear instructions
about how and by whom the award would be reduced tended to produce more consistent
jury awards when comparing significantly negligent plaintiffs to minimally negligent ones.
Id. at 735-36. This further reinforces the notion that clarifying legal norms can positively
affect jury decision making.
425. Diamond et al., supra note 418, at 319-22.
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narrowing the information gap may result in more accurate decisionmaking.426
Of course, even if additional information and normative guidance is
given, this is no guarantee that the additional material will be understood by jurors. 4 27 However, with additional guidance there is at least
the possibility that some jurors will be able to assimilate the new
material and, through the deliberative process, bring greater understanding to the jury as a whole. Unfortunately, these studies do not
provide consistent answers to the question of how best to guide jury
decision-making. Included in these studies were a variety of instructional concepts, from general to specific, which attempted to demonstrate the
efficacy of different approaches to instructing a jury on an issue. In the
aggregate, it appears that these studies came to varying conclusions.
One possible implication of these studies is that influencing jury
behavior through instructions is far from simple and could lead to
unanticipated problems. That suggests a solution that comes from
outside the realm of jury instructions, which brings us back to the judge.
Clearly, as cases are decided, trial courts can integrate more of those
analyses into jury instructions. However, even then there will be a need
for additional scrutiny in dilution cases, for the problem is not as much
one of understanding, as a lack of capacity or information. Thus, it is
necessary that the decision be made with proper information. Trademark strength in a confusion claim is a sliding scale, and a wrong
decision in any one case is not as problematic, nor likely to be as
drastically wrong, as a wrong decision on fame-a jury is unlikely to find
a weak mark to be a very strong mark, or vice versa. Fame, however,
is a binary decision. A wrong decision, especially a wrong decision in
favor of fame, can lead to significant overprotection of a trademark and
possible anticompetitive and in terrorem effects on other people.'

426. This is, of course, somewhat inferential, in that the studies showing that
information affects damage awards do not necessarily translate when the examples given
to the jury-for example, of other marks determined to be famous-are far more nebulous
than damage figures.
427. See Marder,supra note 322, at 454-56 (reviewing studies showing that jurors have
difficulty understanding the language of jury instructions).
428. E.g., Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 419 (commenting on various studies);
Wissler et al., supra 259 (collecting and analyzing studies); Marder, supra note 322
(collecting and analyzing studies). Individual studies came to specific conclusions favoring
one method or another, but the variation across the studies suggests that no one method
is conclusively superior.
429. Trademark owners overstepping their rights have been termed "trademark
bullies," and the Patent and Trademark Office has been directed to conduct a study of the
issue. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Request for Comments: Trademark
LitigationTactics, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/bullies-survey.jsp (last visited Aug. 30,
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Although there are far fewer cases analyzing fame for dilution purposes
than there are cases analyzing strength for infringement purposes, there
still are enough cases to add useful detail to jury instructions.
E. A Proposal:Jury Instructions With Normative Guidance
The combination of the information gap and the lack of guidance from
jury instructions points to a need for post-trial normative guidance.
That is, when reviewing a jury's decision, (and, presumably, a judge's
decision) an appellate court"'o should determine the legal parameters
within which a jury's decision must fall and then determine whether the
evidence would support a decision within those parameters. However,
although useful, that is not an effective method of injecting normative
guidance into the jury's decision-making process. First of all, there is no
particular reason to keep the normative parameters a secret from the
jury. If an appellate court can promulgate legal parameters that
circumscribe the decision concerning fame, or any other aspect of the
case, then the jury should be given those parameters. In trademark
cases, we see this in the instructions regarding ordinary infringement.43 ' To the extent that judges can give jurors explanations of the
meaning of the statutory terms (hopefully using language that is not
entirely couched in a layer of legalese), and can set parameters within
which the fact-finding process should be cabined, then it seems more
efficient to do so, in the hope that it will prevent reversals and lead to
consistency. Whether such explanations will improve the quality of jury
decision-making is an interesting question. Intuitively, one would
imagine that giving jurors explicit parameters to guide their decision
would avoid the most egregious errors. However, studies of juror
behavior when given additional guidance are not conclusive on this
point. 432 Nevertheless, it seems worth the attempt. On the other
hand, even if more guidance is given to juries, the need for more careful
review should not be ignored. Appellate courts should keep the jury's
area of discretion within legal parameters that are reasonably clear and
understandable to trial judges (who are the first reviewers of jury

2011); see Eric Goldman, Shining the Spotlight on Trademark Bullies (a Long-Delayed
Recap of a Trademark Scholars Roundtable), TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Oct.

13, 2010), http://blog.ericgoldman.orgarchives/2010/10/shining-the-spo.htm.
430. A trial judge reviewing a jury verdict on a post-trial motion also could perform this
task.
431. See, e.g., Jury Instructions, Super Duper, 2008 WL 4328935.
432. See Wissler et al., supra note 259; Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, PreciousLittle
Guidance: Jury Instructionson Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 743 (2000).

Both articles discuss various studies of juries and jury instructions.
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decision-making) and should not automatically defer to the jury's
decision on the facile hope that the jury has understood the boundaries
of its fact-finding authority.
Unfortunately, as seen above, the jury instructions currently used by
courts on the issue of a famous mark clearly lack sufficient guidance.
In an attempt to ameliorate that problem, I offer a set of jury instructions on the issue of fame that include additional parameters to guide
and circumscribe the jury's decision. In particular, I have attempted to
give meaning to the statutory phrases "widely recognized" and "general
The instructions are
consuming public of the United States.""
divided into several segments. This is intended to allow judges to tailor
the instructions according to the circumstances of the case, and
according to the other claims included in the lawsuit. I have annotated
the instructions with case law from which many of these parameters are
drawn. Although these instructions relate only to the issue of fame, they
indicate the kind of detail that could be used to instruct jurors on issues
such as likelihood of dilution. What follows is the proposed instruction.
TRADEMARK DILUTION WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S MARK IS FAMOUS
As I have instructed you, in order to be eligible for protection against
dilution, plaintiffs trademark must be famous. Under the federal dilution
law, a trademark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of the source of the
goods or services of the trademark's owner. When considering whether the
plaintiff's mark is famous, you should undertake a careful examination of
the question.4 34 It is not enough for a trademark to be distinctive to be

considered famous for purposes of dilution protection. To be considered
"famous," the plaintiffs trademark must have been truly prominent and
renowned at the time of the defendant's first commercial use of [its mark].
[In my instructions regarding the plaintiff's infringement claim, I instructed
you on the issue of strong versus weak marks. For purposes of dilution

protection, however, you should understand that strong marks are not

433. See Lanham Act § 43(cX2XA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
434. See, e.g., Green, 486 F.3d at 105 (describing fame as "a rigorous standard, as it
extends protection only to highly distinctive marks that are well-known throughout the
country"); Provide Commerce, Inc. v. Preferred Commerce, Inc., No. 07-80185 CIV, 2008
WL 926777 at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2008) ("rigorous" standard for determining fame).
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necessarily famous marks. Although all famous marks are strong, not all
strong marks are famous. 435 1
When determining whether a mark is widely recognized, you should
consider both geographic and numerical recognition. A famous mark should
be recognized in a substantial part of the United States. 436 This does not
mean that it must be widely recognized in all fifty states. However, a
trademark that is widely recognized only in one part of the country-only in
the West, only in the East, only in the Southwest, only in the Northeast-should not be considered famous. Numerically, if a mark is recognized
by three quarters of the general consuming public, then there is a good
chance that it is famous.437 If a mark is recognized by less than half of the
general consuming public, then you should exercise caution when deciding
whether such a mark is famous.
A mark must be widely recognized by what the law calls the general
consuming public of the United States. This means that a trademark that
is widely recognized by only one segment of the population-for example,
only men, only women, only bicycle riders, only people with high incomes,
only people of a particular ethnic background-would not be considered
famous.438 However, this does not mean that you should only look at the
intended purchaser of the trademarked goods or services. For example,
even though most of the public could not afford to purchase a Rolls Royce
automobile, the Rolls Royce trademark could be widely recognized by a wide
cross section of the general consuming public.
In determining whether the plaintiffs trademark is famous, you may
consider several factors I will describe for you in a moment. These factors
are only suggestions and may not constitute all of the possible types of
evidence indicating whether a mark is famous. The presence or absence of
any one particular factor on this list should not necessarily determine
whether a trademark is famous. You should consider all the relevant
evidence in making your determination. The factors you may wish to
consider include:

435. Obviously, this instruction should only be given where a court has previously
instructed the jury on the issue of strong marks. Since most dilution cases also include an
infringement claim, this normally will be true.
436. Green, 486 F.3d at 105; see Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192
F.3d 633, 641 n.7 (7th Cir. 1999) (dictum) (rejecting geographically limited marks as
famous).
437. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 24:106 at 24-293; WELKOWITZ, Dilution
Supp., supra note 4, at 209.

438. E.g., Roderer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 880 ("niche" fame not sufficient for dilution
eligibility).
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1. the duration, extent and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of
the plaintiff's trademark, whether advertised or publicized by plaintiff or
third parties;
2. the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods offered under
the plaintiff's trademark;
3. the extent of actual recognition of the plaintiff's trademark; and
4. whether the plaintiffs trademark was federally registered. Registration
under state law does not matter for this purpose.439
[In this case, the plaintiff's trademark is federally registered. Earlier, I
instructed you that federal registration meant that you could consider the
plaintiff's trademark to be valid and protectable. While that is true, it does
not mean that the plaintiffs trademark is famous. Therefore, although you
may consider the existence of a federal registration in favor of a finding of
fame, you should not overemphasize its importance in the determination of
fame. Registration, and the other factors that I have suggested to you, are
intended to guide your decision as to whether the plaintiffs mark is widely
recognized by the general consuming public as a designation of the source
of the plaintiffs goods and services. That is the ultimate question that you
must determine.440
[In this case, the plaintiff's mark is not federally registered. Therefore,
you may decide to consider that against a determination that the mark is
famous. However, I must caution you not to overemphasize this factor. A
trademark may be famous even if it is not federally registered. Remember
that the factors I have suggested are intended to guide your decision as to
whether the plaintiff's mark is widely recognized by the general consuming
public as a designation of the source of the plaintiffs goods and services.
That is the ultimate question that you must determine.]
If, after careful examination of the evidence, there is uncertainty about
whether the plaintiffs mark is famous, then you may make a determination
that it is not famous.4 41
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article speaks to the immediate problem of the proper division of
labor between judges and juries. In that regard, it is evident that judges

439. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2)(A)(i)-iv).
440. Use this instruction if, and only if, the plaintiffs mark is federally registered. Use
the next instruction if the plaintiffs mark is not registered. In the unusual case that the
validity of a registration is in issue, a court would have to modify both instructions and
give the modified combination to the jury. But that should be a rare case.
441. KST Elec., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 679; Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal
Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA. & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1158

(2006).
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are not giving juries the appropriate information for the task demanded
of them. It is also evident that juries are being asked to make legal, as
well as factual, determinations, and that this is not an appropriate role
in dilution cases for jurors.
Although the analysis presented here technically only applies to a
narrow band of cases, it also speaks to a larger issue that is relevant to
many dilution cases. That larger issue is the recognition of, and
willingness to address, the many ambiguities in trademark dilution law.
By forcing us to consider how to explain the law to a jury, we are
reminded that courts owe each other and practitioners a reasonable
explanation of the working of the law. This is not to say that courts
should reach out to decide issues unnecessarily. However, courts
deciding dilution cases should not be content with making perfunctory
attempts (or sometimes no attempt) to fit their analyses into the
statutory language. Rather, they should attempt to lay out in greater
detail the proper parameters of the decision. This is especially true of
appellate courts, in two important ways. First, appellate courts should
make a more careful examination of what is an issue of law and what is
an issue of fact. As we have discussed, fame is actually a conglomeration of law and fact, and in order to review a decision properly, an
appellate court ought to try and separate the issues. Second, appellate
courts should be more proactive in giving guidance to lower courts about
the proper parameters of the law. Thus, the ultimate goal of this Article
is to stimulate thought about both the law versus fact issues in dilution
and to promote more communication between courts about what, exactly,
they are doing and why.
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Appendix A
Jury Instructions in Levi, Strauss & Co.
v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Trading Co., 2008 WL 5721750
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008)
What follows is the instructions on the issue of dilution given by the
court.

TRADEMARK DILUTION - ELEMENTS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
In this case, Levi Strauss contends that Abercrombie has diluted Levi Strauss's
Arcuate trademark. "Dilution" means a lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence of
absence of competition, actual or likely confusion, mistake, deception, or
economic injury.
To prove this claim, Levi Strauss has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence the following elements:
1. that it is the owner of a trademark that is famous;
2. that the famous mark is distinctive, either inherently or through acquired
distinctiveness;
3. that Abercrombie is making use of an identical or nearly identical
trademark, in this case the Ruehl design;
4. that Abercrombie's use of its Ruehl design began after Levi Strauss's
Arcuate trademark became famous;
5. and that Abercrombie's use of its Ruehl design is likely to cause dilution by
blurring of Levi's Arcuate trademark.
TRADEMARK DILUTION - FAME OF PLAINTIFF'S MARK
A trademark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public
of the United States as a designation of the source of the goods or services of the
trademark's owner. In determining whether Levi Strauss's Arcuate trademark
is famous, you may consider several factors I will describe for you in a moment.
These factors are only suggestions and may not constitute all of the possible
types of evidence indicating whether a mark is famous. The presence or absence
of any one particular factor on this list should not necessarily determine whether
a trademark is famous. You should consider all the relevant evidence in making
your determination. The factors you should consider are:

508

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

1. the duration, extent and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the
Arcuate trademark, whether advertised or publicized by Levi Strauss or third
parties;
2. the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods offered under
the Arcuate trademark;
3. the extent of actual recognition of the Arcuate trademark; and
4. whether the Arcuate trademark was federally registered.
TRADEMARK DILUTION - FAMOUSNESS
To be "famous," Levi Strauss's Arcuate trademark must have been truly
prominent and renowned at the time of Abercrombie's first commercial use of the
Ruehl design. Levi Strauss's Arcuate trademark must have become very widely
recognized by the consuming public as the designator of Levi Strauss's goods and
must have such significant consumer associations that even uses of marks on
non-competing goods can affect the Arcuate trademark's value.
TRADEMARK DILUTION - DILUTION BY BLURRING
Dilution by blurring is an association arising from the similarity between
Abercrombie's Ruehl design and Levi Strauss's Arcuate trademark that impairs
the distinctiveness of the Arcuate trademark. In determining whether the Ruehl
design is likely to cause dilution by blurring, you may consider all relevant
factors, including the following:
1. the degree of similarity between Abercrombie's Ruehl design and the
Arcuate trademark;
2. the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the Arcuate trademark;
3. the extent to which Levi Strauss is engaging in substantially exclusive use
of the Arcuate trademark;
4. the degree of recognition of the Arcuate trademark;
5. whether Abercrombie intended to create an association with the Arcuate
trademark; and
6. any actual association between Abercrombie's Ruehl design and the Arcuate
trademark.
TRADEMARK DILUTION - ELEMENTS - SIMILARITY

In determining the degree of similarity between the Ruehl design and the
Arcuate trademark, you should consider whether the Arcuate trademark and the
Ruehl design are used on competing goods and whether the Arcuate trademark
and the Ruehl design are identical, or nearly identical, to one another. In order
to be nearly identical, the two designs must be similar enough that a significant
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segment of the target group of customers sees the two designs as essentially the
same.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADEMARK CONFUSION
AND DILUTION
Evidence that establishes a likelihood of confusion also is sufficient to establish
a likelihood of dilution.
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Appendix B
Jury Instructions in University of Kansas v. Sinks,
Case No. 06-2341-JAR (D. Kan. July 9, 2008) (on file with the Author).
What follows is the jury instructions on the federal and state dilution claims in
this matter.

INSTRUCTION NO. 46
KU has also asserted two trademark dilution claims, one under federal law
and one under state law. I will now give you some specific instructions to apply
in considering these claims. Trademark dilution is the lessening of the capacity
of a famous or well-known or distinctive mark or trade dress to identify and
distinguish goods or services." The purpose of the anti-dilution laws is to
protect against the erosion, or blurring, of the trademark's value, or the
tarnishment of a trademark's image."'

INSTRUCTION NO. 47
Dilution can happen in two ways: blurring and tarnishment.
Blurring occurs when a defendant uses an identical or nearly identical version
of the plaintiffs trademark to identify the defendant's goods or services,
creating the possibility that the plaintiffs mark or trade dress will lose its ability
to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiffs product. This can occur even
though there is no confusion as to source, sponsorship, affiliation, or connection.
Tarnishment is using a mark that is identical or nearly identical to a famous
mark or trade dress of the plaintiff in such a way that harms the reputation of
the plaintiffs mark by degrading the public's positive associations with the mark.
If KU proves dilution either by blurring or by tarnishment, then you should
find for KU. KU is not required to prove dilution both by blurring and by
tarnishment.

442. This reflects the definition of dilution included in the original FTDA. That
definition would have applied to the claims for damages, though not the claim for an
injunction. The TDRA replaced this definition with separate definitions of "dilution by
blurring" and "dilution by tarnishment." Lanham Act § 43(c)(2XB), (C), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(cX2)(B), (C).
443. The court's description here is, to be charitable, overstated. The purpose of the
dilution claim is to protect against the blurring of the trademark's distinctiveness, not its
value. Id. § 43(c)(2XB), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(cX2)(B).
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INSTRUCTION NO. 48
Defendants are liable on the federal dilution claim if KU has proven the
following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) KU owns famous marks that are distinctive;
(2) Defendants are making use in commerce of one or more marks that are
so similar to the famous marks as to give rise to an association between the
marks;
(3) Defendants' use began after KU's Marks became famous and distinctive;
and
(4) The association between the marks impairs the distinctiveness of KU's
marks or harms the reputation of the marks through either blurring or
tarnishment.
INSTRUCTION NO. 49
To prevail on its federal law claims for dilution of its marks, KU must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that its marks are "famous." In considering
whether KU's trademarks are "famous," you may consider the following factors:
(1) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity
of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by KU or third parties;
(2) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services
offered under the mark;
(3) The extent of actual recognition of the mark; and
(4) Whether the mark is registered."'
INSTRUCTION NO. 50
Defendants are liable for state dilution if KU has proven the following by a
preponderance of the evidence:
(1) KU's marks are distinctive and famous;
(2) Defendants are making use in commerce of one or more marks that are
identical or nearly identical to KU's marks;
(3) Defendants' use began after KU's marks became distinctive and famous;
and
(4) Defendants' use of a mark identical to or nearly identical to KU's marks
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the marks.

444. Somewhat oddly, the court chose to use the four factors, but not the definition,

contained in the TDRA instead of the eight factors contained in the original FTDA (the
original FTDA had no definition of "famous"). See Lanham Act § 43(c)(2XA)(i)-(iv), 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2XAXi)-(iv); FTDA § 3(c)(1XA)-(H), 109 Stat. at 985-86.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 51
To prevail on its state law claim for dilution, KU must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its mark is "distinctive and famous." In determining
whether the mark is distinctive and famous, consider the following, non-exclusive
list of factors:
(1) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of KU's marks in
Kansas;
(2) The duration and extent of KU's marks in connection with the goods and
services with which the marks are used;
(3) The duration and extent of advertising and publicity of KU's marks in
Kansas;
(4) The geographical extent of the trading area in which KU's marks are
used;
(5) The channels of trade for the goods or services with which KU's marks
are used;
(6) The degree of recognition of KU's marks in the trading areas and
channels of trade in Kansas used by KU and defendants;
(7) The nature and extent of use of the same or a similar marks by third
parties; and
(8) Whether KU's marks are subject to a federal or State of Kansas
registrations.44 s
INSTRUCTION NO. 52
To prevail on its dilution claims, KU need not prove actual or likely confusion.

445. Except for the effect of a state registration, the Kansas dilution statute mimics the
factors included in the original federal dilution statute. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-214. As

can be seen, these are not the same as the factors included in the instruction regarding the
federal dilution claim that used the current TDRA factors.
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Appendix C
Jury Instructions in adidas-America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc.,
Civil Case No.01-1655-KT (D. Or. May 1, 2008) (on file with
the Author).
What follows are the instructions on both federal and state dilution claims in
this matter.

INSTRUCTION NO. 31
Dilution
adidas has also brought three trademark and/or trade dress dilution claims,
two under federal law and one under state law. I will now give you some specific
instructions to apply in considering these claims.
Under federal law, trademark or trade dress dilution is the lessening of the
capacity of a famous or well-known or distinctive mark or trade dress to identify
and distinguish goods or services as coming from a single source. The purpose
of the anti-dilution laws is to protect against erosion of the trademark's or trade
dress' value as a source identifier, or the tarnishment of a trademark's or trade
dress' image. The mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's
mark with a famous mark is not enough to establish dilution.
adidas has asserted two claims for dilution under federal law. In one claim,
adidas asserts that Payless has used design features that dilute the distinctive
quality of adidas's Three-Stripe Mark. In the other claim, adidas asserts that
Payless has used design features that dilute the distinctive quality of adidas's
SUPERSTAR Trade Dress.
Under state law, trademark dilution requires adidas to prove a likelihood of
injury to business reputation or dilution of the distinctive quality of the ThreeStripe Mark.
INSTRUCTION NO. 32
Dilution
Payless is liable on the first federal dilution claim if adidas has proven each
of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) The Three-Stripe Mark is famous and distinctive;
(2) Payless is making use in commerce of one or more design features that are
identical or nearly identical to the Three-Stripe Mark;
(3) Payless's use began after the Three-Stripe Mark became famous; and
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(4) Payless's use of a design feature identical to or nearly identical to the ThreeStripe Mark caused actual dilution of the distinctive quality of the Three-Stripe
Mark."'*
INSTRUCTION NO. 34
Dilution
To prevail on its federal law claims for dilution of its Three-Stripe Mark and/or
SUPERSTAR Trade Dress, adidas must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that its Three-Stripe Mark and/or SUPERSTAR Trade Dress are
"famous" and "distinctive." In considering whether adidas's trademark and/or
trade dress are "famous" and "distinctive," you may consider the following
factors:
1) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the trademark and/or
trade dress;
2) The duration and extent of use of the trademark and/or trade dress in
connection with the goods or services with which the trademark and/or trade
dress is used;
3) The duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the trademark and/or
trade dress;
4) The geographical extent of the trading area in which the trademark and/or
trade dress is used;
5) The channels of trade for the goods or services with which the trademark
and/or trade dress is used;
6) The degree of recognition of the trademark and/or trade dress in the trading
areas and channels of trade used by adidas and Payless;
7) The nature and extent of use of the same or similar trademark and/or trade
dresses by third parties; and
8) Whether the trademark and/or trade dress was registered.
INSTRUCTION NO. 35
Dilution
As discussed above, to prevail on its federal law claims for dilution of its
Three-Stripe Mark and/or SUPERSTAR Trade Dress, adidas must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Payless used one or more design features
that were identical or nearly identical to those owned by adidas.

446. This instruction reflects federal law prior to the TDRA. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at

433 (actual dilution required to prevail on federal dilution claim). This instruction was
used because the TDRA only applies to claims for injunctions and claims for damages that
arose after October 6, 2006. See Pub. L. No. 109-312, 127 Stat. 1730, 1733 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). Although this claim was tried in 2008, the claim arose
prior to the TDRA. See adidas-America, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-42 (order granting

summary judgment, in part).
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"Identical or nearly identical" does not mean that the adidas mark or trade
dress has to be exactly the same as Payless's design features. The two are
considered "identical or nearly identical" if a significant segment of the
consuming public would see the two as essentially the same.
INSTRUCTION NO. 36
Dilution
Under federal law, dilution can happen in two ways: blurring and tarnishment.
Blurring occurs when the association arising from the similarity between a
design feature used by Payless with the mark or trade dress used by adidas
impairs the distinctiveness of the adidas mark or trade dress. Factors you can
consider in determining whether dilution by blurring has occurred include:
1) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade dress used by adidas and
Payless's design features;
2) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of adidas's mark or trade
dress;
3) The extent to which adidas is engaged in substantially exclusive use of the
mark or trade dress;
4) The degree of recognition of the mark or trade dress with adidas;
5) Whether Payless intended to create an association with adidas's mark or trade
dress; and
6) Any actual association between the design features used by Payless and
adidas's mark or trade dress.447
Tarnishment is using design features that are identical or nearly identical to
a famous mark or trade dress of the plaintiff in such a way that harms the
reputation of the plaintiffs mark or trade dress by improperly associating it with
an inferior or offensive product or service.
If adidas proves dilution either by blurring or by tarnishment, then you should
find for adidas. adidas is not required to prove dilution both by blurring and by
tarnishment.
To prevail on its dilution claims, adidas need not prove likelihood of confusion.
INSTRUCTION NO. 37
Dilution
Payless is liable on the state dilution claim if adidas has proven the following
by a preponderance of the evidence:

447. Although the court purported to use the pre-TDRA standard of actual dilution, it
instructed the jury using the factors contained in the TDRA to show likelihood of dilution.
See Lanham Act § 43(cX2XBXi)-(vi), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2XB)(i)-(vi). This could have
resulted in an erroneous conclusion by the jury, since the likelihood of dilution standard
is supposed to be easier to prove than actual dilution.
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1) The Three-Stripe Mark is distinctive;
2) Payless is making use in commerce of one or more design features that are
identical or nearly identical to the Three-Stripe Mark;
3) Payless's use began after the Three-Stripe Mark became distinctive; and
4) Payless's use of design features identical to or nearly identical to the ThreeStripe Mark presents a likelihood of injury to the business reputation of adidas
or of diminution of the Three-Stripe Mark as an advertising tool among
consumers of adidas's products.448
INSTRUCTION NO. 38
Dilution
To prevail on its state law claim for dilution of its Three-Stripe Mark, adidas
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its Three-Stripe Mark is
"distinctive." For this state law claim, adidas does not need to prove that the
Three-Stripe Mark is famous. Distinctiveness may be developed by long use,
consistent superior quality instilling customer satisfaction, or extensive
advertising. If the Three-Stripe Mark has come to signify adidas's product in the
mind of a significant portion of the consumers, and if the mark evokes favorable
images of adidas or its products, the mark is distinctive.
INSTRUCTION NO. 39
Dilution
Under state law, blurring occurs when the association arising from the
similarity between design features used by Payless with the mark used by adidas
impairs the distinctiveness of the adidas mark.
Also under state law, tarnishment is using design features that are identical
or nearly identical to a distinctive mark of the plaintiff in such a way that harms
the reputation of the plaintiffs mark by improperly associating it with an
inferior mark or trade dress or offensive product or service.
If adidas proves dilution either by blurring or by tarnishment, then you should
find for adidas. adidas is not required to prove dilution both by blurring and by
tarnishment.

448. The court chose to instruct the jury on the state dilution claim, even though at
that time Oregon's dilution law only permitted injunctive relief. Thus, the state claim was
properly the province of the judge, not the jury. To the extent that the jury awarded
monetary damages based on the lower standard of proof available under state law, this
would be a serious error. As this instruction makes clear, the state standard was likelihood
of dilution, not actual dilution. As the next instruction makes clear, a mark did not need
to be famous to claim protection under Oregon law at that time. This has since been
changed. See OR. REV. STAT.

§ 647.107.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 47
Damages
For adidas's federal dilution claim, adidas seeks to recover:
1) Actual damages; and
2) Payless's profits.
In order for adidas to be entitled to recover actual damages or Payless's profits
on adidas's dilution claims under federal law, adidas must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Payless willfully intended to trade on adidas's
reputation or to cause dilution of the Three-Stripe Mark and/or SUPERSTAR
Trade Dress.
adidas has the burden of proving actual damages by a preponderance of the
evidence. Damages means the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly
compensate adidas for any injury you find was caused by Payless's dilution of
adidas's Three-Stripe Mark and/or SUPERSTAR Trade Dress.
In determining the amount of adidas's actual damages, you should consider
the following:
1) The injury to adidas's reputation;
2) The injury to adidas's goodwill, including injury to adidas's general business
reputation; and
3) Whether the evidence would support a reasonable royalty.
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Appendix D
Jury instructions in SLB Toys USA, Inc. v. Wham-O, Inc.,
NO. CV 06-1382-RSWL (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with
the Author).
This is an excerpt from the trial transcript containing instructions regarding the
dilution claims.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The owner of a famous mark also may be entitled to
damages for dilution of the mark. Dilution is a lessening of
the availability of a famous trademark to signify its source.
The elements of a claim for dilution that Wham-O must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence in this case in order to
be entitled to damages for dilution are as follows:
1. That the mark was famous at the time that SLB

page 936
Trial - Day 6 (FINAL)

1 began using it.
2 2. That SLB's use of the mark caused a lessening
3 of the acquired distinctiveness, also known as secondary
4 meaning, of the mark.
5 3. That SLB willfully intended to trade on
6 Wham-O's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark.
7 In determining whether Wham-O's mark was famous at
8 the time SLB began using it, you may consider the following
9 factors:
10 1. The degree of acquired distinctiveness of the
11 mark.
12 2. The duration and extent of the use of the mark
13 in connection with the goods with which the mark is used.
14 3. The duration and extent of advertising and
15 publicity of the mark.
16 4. The geographical extent of the trading area in
17 which the mark is used.
18 5. The channels of trade for the goods or services
19 with which the mark is used.
20 6. The degree of recognition of the mark in the
21 trading areas and channels of trade used by Wham-O and SLB.
22 7. The nature and extent of use of the same or
23 similar marks by third parties.
24 8. Whether the mark is registered.
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